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FOREWORD 
In early 1976, the Canadian Association for the 
Mentally Retarded (CAMR) requested provincial 
associations for the mentally retarded to set up Task 
Groups to consider legislative and legal matters 
related to mental retardation, Interim reports from 
the Task Groups were given at Regional Seminars in 
June 1976 in preparation for final submission to 
CAMR's National Conference on Law and Legislation, 
(Ottawa, October, 1976). 
Contained herein are the first monographs 
resulting from the work of the Task Groups and other 
resource people engaged by CAMR. The four monographs 
in the series are: 
- Community Residences: The Zoning Issue 
- Estate Planning for the Parents of Mentally 
Retarded Persons 
- A Multi-Component Advocacy/Protection Schema 
- Education for Retarded Children: Access? 
Integration? Parent Participation? 
The topic areas covered are only a beginning. 
Readers of this series are encouraged to forward 
to CAMR their reactions to the content of each of 
the monographs so that improvements can be made. 
A special note of appreciation must go to 
Paul McLaughlin, consulting lawyer with CAMR, for his 
work in editing some of the documents, writing and 
reworking others. As well, this work could not have 
been undertaken without the financial assistance 
provided by the National Welfare Grants Directorate 
of Health and Welfare Canada. 
The Association Resources Division (which initiated 
and directed the Task Groups, the Conference presenters 
and the production of this series) encourages members 
of associations to use the monographs as an opportunity 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much like everything else, human services in 
technologically advanced and economically affluent nations 
have undergone a process of evolution which has a certain 
regularity, r epetitiveness, and therefore predictability. 
Among these major phenomena in service system evolution are 
(1) increasing complexity; (2) a dramatic increase in 
scientific knowledge, particularly in the area of social 
psychology and organizational dynamics, which can have a 
profound bearing on the maintenance or improvement of 
service quality ; (3) introduction of technology into 
service delivery , wi t h a concomitant threat to privacy, to 
individualization, and possibly to other client rights; 
(4) rising cos t s which contribute toward greater call, as 
well a s greater need, for expenditure accountability; (5) 
continuing of f ragmentation of services; and (6) in many 
instances, r i sing consumer dissatisfaction. These trends 
or their asso ciated dynamics can fall into two categories: 
those having a strong potential for jeopardizing the quality 
of services, and those having the latent potential for 
improving it. The fact that the above trends are apt to 
jeopardize service quality, while also having strong promise 
for improving it, make it very urgent that much more intense 
and conscious effort be directed toward the institution of 
an array of safeguards and other measures which are apt to 
maintain or improve the quality of service. 
However, while a vast amount of lip-service is paid to 
the need for service quality and quality safeguards, 
remarkably little is being done about it in a systemic; 
sustained and actually effective fashion. After all, the 
institution of quality safeguards is, in effect, a function 
and expression of the process of change agentry, and human 
service structures have many built-in resistances to the 
change process. This is a fact which is often hard to 
accept by service system administrators who not merely pay 
lip-service to the institutionalization of the change 
process, but who usually sincerely believe that they and 
their agency are committed to innovation, to experimentation, 
to adaptation, etc. 
Yet ultimately, to use the language and concepts of 
organizational dynamics, service delivery agencies are 
essentially quasi-bureaucracies which require a great deal 
of continuity and routine in their operation in order to 
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function relatively efficiently. Change and continuity 
are inherently opposed to each other, and while too 
much change would result in chaos, there are extremely 
few human service agencies that change as much as they 
shouJ.d. This fact should be faced by service administrators 
not with defensiveness, but with a certain sympathy and 
understanding of the human condition, because agencies 
ultimately are no more than collectivities of human beings 
carrying out functions. Being human, they are inclined 
to carry out functions with which they are familiar, from 
which they receive rewards, and which do not inconvenience 
them excessively--if at all. 
Increased recognition of the needs and rights of 
service consumers (indeed, of people who are not now such 
consumers but ought to have the opportunity to be), coupled 
with the aforementioned dissatisfaction with past service 
patterns, plus probably some other conceptual and social 
developments, has led to the rise of an advocacy movement. 
This movement would give greater voice and power to 
citizens, and even many workers within the service 
establishment acknowledge that the inconvenience of being 
confronted by advocacy that may be directed against 
themselves is adaptive for themselves and their agencies. 
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THE HISTORICAL-CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF ADVOCACY 
A clearly conceptualized advocacy construct in the 
human service context is relatively new. While advocacy 
itself has always taken place, the clear formulation of 
advocacy as a schema or system has a much more recent 
history. Indeed, the novelty of a clearly conceptualized 
advocacy approach and component in the human services 
context is such that the very term "advocacy" can 
scarcely be found in the human services literature prior 
to approximately 1970. 1 vividly remember the time when 
most people would stumble over the word trying to 
pronounce it. 
As is often the case, various circumstances, 
including the needs of the times, can propel a concept 
to wide public attention in a remarkably short period. 
So it has been with the advocacy concept. However, when 
this sort of thing happens, there is almost invariably 
a great deal of confusion and distortion. People may be 
exposed to a new word, may incorporate the word into 
their vocabulary, but may not as yet have internalized a 
cl.ear concept as to what the word is all about, or what 
it stands for. So it is with the term and concept of t advocacy, much as · it is al.so with "normalization," 
"integration," "mainstreaming," "deinstitutional.ization,v 
and others. As we proceed to delineate a global advocacy 
system, it is useful . to review at least three ideological/ 
historical roots of the recent advocacy movement, and then 
proceed to various definition issues. 
One major contributor to the advocacy/protection 
movement has been the Judea-Christi.an tradition. The 
Old Testament is full of admonitions to protect the 
lowly, the orphaned, the widow, etc. In the New 
Testament, concern with the weak, sick, handicapped 
and abandoned became even more central, and is 
epitomized in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and 
that of the sheep and the goats ("I was in prison, and 
you visited me," etc.). Many people, despite their 
flight from Judea-Christian denominations, still 
idealize this altruistic orientation to the disadvantaged 
or cast-off members of society. 
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A second major tradition is that which has found 
its way to us through Hegelian philosophy and its various 
Marxist interpretations and applications. Often quite 
unconsciously, the idea of the operation of mutually 
opposed forces (as in thesis and antithesis) has 
become widely accepted and adopted in the minds of people, 
especially in various fields of social science and 4 
social change that are concerned with social tensions 
and conflict resolution. Within this ideological 
tradition, advocacy is conceptualized as the antithesis 
of an established power or interest (the thesis, or 
vice versa) which is seen as detrimental to a person 
or group--and in most instances an assumedly disadvantaged 
group. Thus, we see many elements of the conflict 
model in many advocacy approaches, and can often detect 
its Marxist-Hegelian roots by its (not uncommonly 
unconscious) vocabulary: class struggle, the people, 
workers, masses, the enemy, oppressors, establishment, 
aggression, reactionaries, liberation, power, the 
cause, coalition, cadre, etc. 
A third major intellectual tradition that has given 
rise to the advocacy movement is the growing realization 
in just the last few years that human organizations are 
subject to certain laws, and that they operate with 
certain sets of built-in dynamics which can scarcely 
be overcome by individual efforts, and then only for 
short periods of time, or for a limited number of 
occasions, but not for most organizations most of the 
time. Thus, through the study of complex social systems, 
and especially the work of people such as J. Forrester, 
we have come to recognize a number of distressing 
realities: 
1. Over the long run, organizations serve themselves 
more than they serve any other purpose. 
2. Excellence in complex social systems contexts 
is most difficult to attain; and once attained, it is 
subject to dynamics and stresses which make it extremely 
unlikely that it will be maintained. In other words, 
probabilistically, human institutions, social systems, 
and organizations (including human service organizations 
and agencies) tend toward decay, mediocrity and worse. 
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3. The entire concept of conflict of interest has 
received much clearer conceptualization in recent years. 
Because the above-mentioned organizational dynamics 
tend to possess organizational members to a degree 
which was previously unrecognized (largely because of 
the unconsciousness or counter-intuitiveness of 
organizational processes), it is now widely acknowledged 
that the representation by individual actors (and even 
organizations) of particular interests should not be 
jeopardized by the co-existence of clashing interests 
within the same mandate or organization. This has 
implications to which I shall return later; 
Recognition and gradual admission of these and 
related organizational realities has brought more 
people to at least an intellectual acceptance of the 
need for independent and powerful representation of 
impaired citizens, and indeed of any citizens who must 
deal with powerful organized societal structures. However, 
it is also essential to recognize the source or sources 
of the remaining opposition to the advocacy movement. 
It is quite likely that most of this opposition results 
from ignorance or denial of the existence and power of 
various organizational dynamics, such as those listed 
above.* Such opposition may come from politicians 
and from human service agency people whom one would 
often expect to be more sophisticated about organizational 
realities than ordinary citizens. The opposition may be 
embodied in the view that good clinical agency service 
is advocacy; that if professionals only practiced 
sound techniques, no other advocacy would be needed; 
that efforts should be directed toward service 
improvement rather than advocacy 
* It is very difficult to relate to the powerful and 
usually overriding strength of universal characteristics 
of organizations without having studied the social laws 
that determine much of organizational functioning, For 
a relatively quick introduction and overview of this topic, 
the reader is referred to Berelson and Steiner (1964), 
Hage and Aiken (1970), Rothman (1974), Weick (1969), 
Weissman (1973), and Wolfensberger (1973). 
_, 
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and advocacy organization-building; and/or that such 
advocacy structures should be dismantled once they 
have cleaned up a service area that had lost its 
(former?) purity and quality. Of course, such a 
conceptualization--even if well-intentioned rather 
than merely defensive--simply fails to incorporate 
the empirical facts of human and especially organizational .a 
behaviour. Even in human service workers who are ~ 
intimately familiar with organizational dynamics, the 
reality that they are a factotum of an organization 
that has all sorts of purposes and functions other 
than the officially stated and nobly worded ones may 
be so threatening to self-concept and self-esteem as 
to elicit denial. Indeed, the prevalence of this type 
of self-defensive blindness and even arrogance is, 
itself, one of the overwhelmingly real, maladaptive 
and yet universal dynamics of organizations. 
This issue of conflict of interest is one that must 
be understood and appreciated in order to come to grips 
with any number of problems related to advocacy for, 
and protection of, people. It is for this reason that 
the topic will now be discussed even though this 
discussion here postpones our addressing ourselves to 
the question, "what is advocacy?". 
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THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROBLEM 
One of the principles that human service workers 
as well as ordinary citizens find most difficult to 
relate to is that in human services, as in the larger 
world, there are an unlimited number of situations 
where two valid principles clash and cannot coexist. 
People assume that when they are confronted with a 
situation where two principles clash, then one or both 
must be invalid, which is not necessarily true. Often, 
people are so discombobulated by this phenomenon that 
they get caught in all sorts of dilemmas and twisted 
solutions. For example, the welfare of service providers 
and the welfare of service consumers are rarely 
identical, yet is is as valid for service providers 
to have good experiences, lead constructive lives, and 
have their needs met as it is for service consumers. 
Similarly, it is desirable to have both cheap 
energy and plentiful energy, but there is a constant 
conflict between these two, and usually one is sacrificed 
for the other. Self-advocacy vs. other-advocacy is 
another example. In many situations, it is infinitely 
more efficient to go ahead and advocate for another 
person, solve that person's problem quickly and 
efficiently, and settle that particular problem. On 
the other hand, over the long run, it is more constructive 
for the person to learn to solve his or her own problem, 
but that may require prolonged or difficult guidance 
and tuition in problem solving. As Simon Olshansky 
(1969) has written, in human service syst~ms, decisions 
are often made for clients by staff because advancing 
the client to competent decision-making would be 
costly and time-consuming. Built-in dilemmas such as 
these do not have solutions. I mention this here 
because in many advocacy-related situations, there will 
be conflicting principles. 
Conflict of interest is merely one type of conflict 
between incompatible but often nevertheless valid, sound, 
even moral, dynamics or forces. In advocacy and 
protection, it· is one of the gravest issues. It means 
that there is more than one person's or group's interest 
i involved in an action, that these interests are at odds 
with each other, and that therefore, there exists a 
tension that must be expected to be unsustainable and 
that will eventually be resolved by a tipping of the 
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scales into one direction or another. Unlike some tensions 
that are adaptive and lead to better solutions, the tensions 
of conflict of interest are rarely adaptive, and usually 
lead to inferior solutions in which one interest is 
sacrificed entirely or in part. 
In order to concretize the role of conflict of 
interest in human service-related advocacy, a number 
of real-life examples will be cited. The first three 
examples are borrowed from Gilhool (1976, p. 164). They 
illustrate how a human service worker can be beset by 
tremendous pressures to put the interests of the agency 
above the interests of weak or disadvantaged people who 
may be the agency's clients. 
On January 13, 1973, at 6:30 in the morning, 
Benny Parrish, a public assistance case worker in 
Oakland, California, was instructed to join 
"Operation Bedcheck," a search of the houses of 
public assistance recipients--"especially the beds, 
closets, bathrooms, and other places of 
concealment," to determine if there was a man in 
the house and, hence, whether assistance could be 
terminated. He refused, asserting that such 
4 
searches were illegal. He was fired for insubordination 
The County Civil Service Commission upheld his firing. , 
But the California Supreme Court, in an unanimous , 
opinion, held that Benny Parrish was protected in 
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his right to assert the rights of his clients and 
ordered him reinstated. 
On the evening of July 27, 1976, Ocania Chalk, 
a public assistance case worker in York County, 
Pennsylvania, attended a meeting of public 
assistance recipients, a group called the Public 
Assistance Committee. There, he criticized the 
personnel and policies of the York County Assistance 
Office. He urged recipients to "get on case workers' 
backs and demand their rights;" he stated that some 
case workers failed to accord recipients dignity 
and to inform them of their rights of appeal; and, 
quoting Frederick Douglass, he exhorted recipients 
to "agitate, agitate, agitate." He was suspended 
from his job without pay for "having caused 
embarassment and unfavourable publicity to the 4 
department." The State Civil Service Commission 
upheld his suspension. But the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, generally more conservative than 
California's, reversed, holding Ocania Chalk's 
remarks protected by the First Amendment. "As 
a member of that governmental institution (York 
County Assistance Office)," the Court found, "he 
had a unique, and valuable, perspective, from· 
which to view it." The benefit of that perspective 
could not be denied to his clients or to the public, 
From 1966 through 1969, Father Joseph Donahue, 
Chaplain of Manteno State Hospital in Illinois 
("a gigantic institution operating on a skimpy 
budget," as the court put it), engaged in a 
campaign of public criticism of the institution. 
He wrote in a union newspaper column; he addressed 
the State Federation of Labour and made other 
public speeches; he wrote letters to the governor 
and to the editor of the local newspaper; and he 
published a paid advertisement in that paper. He 
complained, inter alia, of insufficient employees, 
unqualified employees, inadequate care, and in the 
paid advertisement criticized the Director of the 
Mental Health Department and the Superintendent of 
the Hospital. In 1969, he was fired. He sued in 
federal court for reinstatement. He won and was 
awarded back pay, punitive damages and attorney's 
fees. 
Another relevant and recurring type of conflict 
of interest may be found in the field of child placement .. 
Years ago (and to some degree to this day), child placement 
agencies typically were mandated and funded to attend to 
homeless, mostly orphaned, children, and then later to 
socially abandoned or abused children. One of the mandates 
of such agencies was either to find adoptive homes for 
such children, or at least to find foster homes in the 
meantime. Before the helping forms in our society became 
highly structured, homeless children were typically "taken 
in" informally, e.g., when parents died, it was very 
common for relatives or neighbours to take in the children 
and raise them, and nothing much was made of it. In large 
households, it made little difference whether seven or 
nine children were raised. It is still that way in some 
cultures, and even in parts of North America, as in the 
Canadian Maritime provinces. 
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Through professional and case work, the child 
placement agencies tried to accomplish something 
similar, except that in the case of foster children, 
the foster parents would be paid; and in the case of 
adoptive families, they would not be, as they would 
be rearing a child as their own. A major reason some 
children had to be fostered instead of adopted was that 
many children that ended up homeless were not necessarily 
parentless. Perhaps their parents were non-functional 
but would not release their child for adoption. At 
any rate, the child placement agencies typically tried 
to build up a certain pool of foster families that could 
provide emergency places where the agency could place 
a child on short notice into a "holding pattern" while 
it tried to see what else it could do for the child. 
However, what often also happened was that the 
child placement agencies would place a child on short 
notice into an available foster home, and the foster 
family would grow very attached to the child and want 
to adopt him/her. That would throw the placement agency 
into consternation, because if that foster family adopted 
the child, the agency would lose that home as a 
conveniently available future foster home. In turn, this 
would mean that case workers would have to go out and 
aggressively search for and develo·p new rotating foster 
homes, which was a great inconvenience to others. So 
they commonly would keep a child in a home only until 
the foster parents began to show signs of growing 
affection, and then they would jerk the child out and 
place him/her into another foster family, and so on, from 
one placement to another. 
In one public presentation where we explained this 
practice, one of the men in the audience jumped up 
and started shouting, "So that's why they did that to 
me." The man, apparently in his forties, had grown up 
as a foster child, and had been moved from home to home 
until he was of legal age. Though now working in a 
human service role himself, he had never understood the 
reason for his being rotated through so many homes. He 
shouted from the floor, "I used to think they did that 
to me because I was bad." 
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Innumerable child placement agencies have perpetuated 
what one can only call legalized and institutionalized 
crimes against homeless children. In recent years there 
have been significant broad advances into more appropriate 
handling of children by child placem~nt agencies-~although 
many continue the practice of careless and "musical-chair" 
~ placement. 
One can understand some of these practices much 
better if one can recognize that the child placement 
agencies had conflicts of interest when it came to 
placement of children in foster homes. It was in an 
agency's interest to maintain foster homes on an 
available rotating basis, because then the staff did 
not have to go out constantly and recruit new ones. 
Secondly, it may actually have been in the interest 
of some other child who came along la~er on, for a 
specific foster home to be available for emergency 
placement, illustrating that there sometimes are 
conflicts between the interests of different clients: 
what is good for one client may diminish the welfare 
of another. Interestingly, placement agencies have 
hardly ever admitted to this reality, and to this 
day, they will generally deny it. 
Teacher's groups have commonly been opposed to measures 
which assess teacher and school performance. If it is 
found that their performance as teachers is inferior, they 
might lose their jobs. Whose interests are they defending? 
It is in the children's interests to have the quality of 
teaching assessed, but teachers see it as their interest 
not to be assessed because it might mean losing one's job. 
Concern with job security led to an unusual instance 
of people doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. 
Today, the lives of institutionalized persons are not 
necessarily being improved through so-called deinstitution-
alization, because they are being dumped into snakepit 
foster and nursing homes, other institutions, etc. The 
Federation of State and County Municipal Employees put 
out a book, entitled Out of Their Beds and Into the Streets 
(Santiestevan, 1975), which validly documents and 
condemns this dumping--but does it for the wrong reasons. 
The union sponsored the book because it wants to save 
the institutions and thus provide jobs. "People have a 
right to be institutionalized." Thus, the wrong people 
(the union) have been doing the right thing (exposing 
the problems of deinstitutionalization) to protect their 
own interests. 
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To illustrate the conflict of interest issue further, 
it should be noted that even families of handicapped 
persons may have such conflicts when they are acting on 
behalf of their own handicapped member. A common 
phenomenon with families who have placed a child in an 
institution is that they do not wish for that person to 
live at home with them later on, or when the child is 
grown. Yet at the same time, they often resist making 
any other kind of suitable arrangement, and may 
obstruct any attempts by other persons or agencies to 
place that person in a more favourable setting, because 
such a move is seen as implicitly interpreting the family 
as having inappropriately abandoned their relative. 
This conflict of interest points out the fact that a 
parent is not always the best advocate for a person. 
Human service workers argue constantly that they 
are idealistic, dedicated, noble, etc. and therefore 
they need not and should not be under any rules concerning 
conflict of interest. The delusions of human service 
workers that they are true to their professional 
moralities and not to their employing agencies, or that 
they are not controlled by their professional groups 
but by their moral commitment to their clients, are 
really quite striking. In their blindness to the dynamics 
that control them, human service workers have fallen 
victims to a professional training that has taught them 
that they are noble and dedicated human beings, 
unselfish, and always ready to give for someone else. 
In essence, they have been taught that a good human 
service worker does not have conflicts of interest. 
This is of course, not true, but is one of the many 
unconscious falsehoods which are deeply embedded in the 
professional socialization process of human services. 
The fact is that few human service workers are 
emancipated from their culture and its values, and 
none from their humanity and its dynamics. They are 
encaptured by human foibles and weaknesses, by their 
culture, and by the structure of human service systems. 
Fewer safeguards and precautions would be needed if 
more workers were even able to perceive and admit the 
conflicting pressures under which they work. 
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Despite its own shortcomings, the legal profession 
has a very clear understanding of these issues, and 
there is much to be learned in this area from the law, 
as by and large, lawyers are highly attuned to 
conflicts of interest. Judges and justices in our 
courts do not rule on a case in which they have an 
interest. A justice will disqualify him/herself if 
a case comes up in which he/she has a financial 
or other interest--which is not at all uncommon. 
Indeed, it is well understood in the judicial system 
that one should avoid not only conflict of interest, 
but even the appearance of such a conflict. Similarly, 
we expect avoidance of the appearance of conflicts 
of interest even when we are willing to discount 
their actual presence. Charles Wilson, who was 
nominated by President Eisenhower as Secretary of 
Defense, held approximately $2 million worth of stock 
in General Motors when he came up for congressional 
approval. Before he could be confirmed, he had to 
sell this stock at a vast loss, because as Secretary 
of Defense, he could not afford even the appearance 
of a conflict of interest with a major defense 
contractor (even though he believed that "what is 
good for General Motors is good for the country"). 
If Watergate has done nothing else, it has underlined 
the fact that the suggestion of conflict of interest 
can be as destructive as the actual or real conflict 
itself. 
Common Cause is one of the groups in the United 
States that are advocating for the legal end of 
conflict of interest situations in government. In 
1975, the governor of New York signed an executive 
order mandating full financial disclosure for every 
policy-making state official. Proposed legislation 
would also prohibit legislators and legislative 
employees from representing clients before state 
agencies, which they were able to do before. This 
is one of the changes that Common Cause lobbying has 
brought about. 
In order to recognize conflicts of interest, it 
is useful to be aware of its five major recurring 
sources. 
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a) What is good for the agency is not necessarily 
good for the clients. It is well known from organizationa l 
dynamics that organizations are like people in the way 
they function. Organizations have a life of their own 
where survival is paramount, anything will be done to 
maintain it. People may be more ready to sacrifice 
their lives than organizations are. So agency survival 
interests may clash with the interests of the client. 
For instance, scandals, painful revelations or budget 
cuts might happen if client interests were uncompromisingly 
(or even moderately compromisingly) pursued. 
b) The professions of various staff members may 
make all sorts of compromising demands. Indeed, the 
codes of ethics of many professions contain some immoral 
components. Examples are the various codes of ethics 
provisions in the professions of law and pharmacy, 
designed as price fixing collusions. One unjust impact 
of such practices has been the prevention of the posting 
of drug prices in drug stores in poverty neighbourhoods 
so that poor people would be able to do comparative 
shopping. 
c) Being accountable to superiors who have all 
sorts of motives and interests is another source of 
conflict. Close-outs in vocational rehabilitation are 
a classic example. A certain number of close-outs may 
be required by a certain date, and as it gets close to 
the deadline, counsellors may be told by their superiors 
to close clients out in order to meet the required quota. 
d) The interests of one client or protege may 
interfere with the interests of another. It may be in 
the interest of Client A to get all of the money, or 
the attention, regardless of the needs of Client B or 
C; it may be in the interest of the protege to receive 
all the attention of an advocate. Thus, the moment a 
person has more than one client, or the moment an 
advocate has more than one protege, a conflict usually 
exists. This potential source of conflict is rarely 
recognized. 
e) The fourth source of conflict may be avoided 
by having only one client or protege, but the personal 
interests of the human service worker or advocate 
cannot be avoided, and it is almost always at odds with 
those of the client or protege. It may be in the 
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interest of the client for the staff member never to take 
a vacation nor have time off, eat, rest, have leisure, 
etc, Thus, sheer survival is a source of conflict. 
In attempting to either resolve conflicts of 
interest, or conflicts of competing principles that have 
nothing to do with conflicts of interest, a few thoughts 
and strategies are offered that have often proved useful. 
First, it is very important to distinguish 
theoretically between a compromise and a trade-off. A 
trade-off must occur in a situation in which it is 
intrinsically impossible to maximize two outcomes 
simultaneously, because the two outcomes are inherently 
in competition with each other. A compromise exists 
when one has to choose among two or more outcomes in 
which the outcomes are not intrinsically incompatible, 
but are suboptimal only because of certain extrinsic 
circumstances. 
An example of a compromise would be almost any 
instance in which service quality is lowered merely 
because of the scarcity of funds, but where there is 
no reason why one might not simultaneously have high 
funding and high quality, if only the funding 
situation were more favourable. In contrast, a 
l, classical example in which an optimal solution is 
~ even theoretically impossible exists in those instances 
in which the optimal location of a service to 
devalued persons would be in a certain neighbourhood 
(such as a downtown area) in which, for probably 
valid reasons, there are already a number of other 
well-placed services to devalued persons, and where 
the addition of yet another such service would 
saturate community tolerance and its potential for 
assimilating devalued people. Obviously, not all 
programs can be located in the same optimal 
location. On the other hand, if the new service 
located itself in another area reasonably removed 
from a congregation of other services to devalued 
clients, it would probably be penalized in terms 
of ease of access from and to the service region 
population. 
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Secondly, it is important to recognize what it 
is that is at issue when sacrifices are at stake. 
A great deal of judgement is required in determining 
the relative merit of two conflicting principles. 
They may both be valid, but one may be more universal 
than the other, or one may have more long-term payoff. 
Often, it is necessary to trade off one good principle 
for another good one. One way to make these judgements 
is to acknowledge that one principle is good, but the 
other one is even better; or that they are both bad, but 
that one is less so. 
One fundamental distinction to be made here is that 
among principles, strategies, and tactics. Tactics 
may be compromised very readily; strategies should only 
rarely be compromised; and principles should never be 
sacrificed. Interestingly, conflicts such as the ones 
sketched above generally occur between strategies 
rather than principles. If they occur among 
principles, then one is either dealing with principles 
at different levels of generality, or one is trying to 
adhere to two or more self-contradictory principles 
at the same time. 
What the above rationales and realities imply is 
that human service workers should become more 
conscious of, and perhaps differentiate among: the 
compromises or trade-offs which they have made; 
those compromised or traded-off measures which are 
simply not under their control and which cannot be 
improved at a given moment; and those measures which 
m~ght very well be improved either by programmatic 
changes, by ideological changes, or by better funding. 
While choosing one of the two horns of a compromise 
or trade-off dilemma could be a relatively rational 
and highly objectifiable task, human service planners 
and decision-makers typically do not choose too well. 
This is somewhat puzzling, but becomes more understandable 
when one recalls that most human service workers are not 
oriented to a systems approach, and therefore do not 
automatically fall into a reflexive routine of 
systematically considering, examining, and mutually 
comparing all possible alternatives, costs, and 
benefits. Therefore, a brief and simple guideline 
for making compromises or trade-offs is offered here. 
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1. While suspending judgement, all conceivable 
alternatives should be listed . Typically, this 
takes place optimally in a classical type of 
brainstorming session in a group. 
2. This list of options can be reduced by 
eliminating those that are patently irrelevant, 
or impossible to achieve. 
3. For each remaining option, all conceivable 
benefits should be listed. 
4. The costs (in a broad sense) associated with 
each of the options should also be listed. 
5. One now ranks the options in terms of the 
most promising ra tios of costs to yields. 
6. Only a t this point should one adopt the 
highest-ranked option that is feasible. 
7. The remaining non-utilized options should 
be retained "on file" in case the option that has 
been adopted proves to be unfeasible, unworkable, 
or unsuccessful, leaving open a fall-back on the 
most promising of the remaining options. 
The same procedure can be used for prioritizing 
one's actions, with the relevant ratio here being 
taking into account how feasible a measure is at the 
moment, and how quickly it can be implemented without 
jeopardizing the implementation of more important 
but "slower" measures. 
This section is intended to sensitize the reader 
to the reality and power of conflicting interest. In 
the later section on "Some Basic Assumptions Underlying 
The Proposed Global Model," various implications that 
are specific to advocacy and protection will be 
spelled out. 
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WHAT IS ADVOCACY? 
One major problem in the wider dissemination, and 
at least partial acceptance, of the advocacy concept 
has been the tremendous confusion surrounding the 
definition of the term. Today, it is possible to find 
almost anything labelled advocacy, including some 
highly traditional and even highly dehumanizing services. 
Thus, placing a person in an institution might very well 
be called "institutional advocacy"; providing a person 
with very traditional case work counselling might be 
called "case work advocacy" or "counselling advocacy"; 
s11bmitting a news release regarding a devalued group 
of people to the media might be called "public advocacy"; 
etc. In fact, this bandwagon phenomenon has almost 
the effect of perverting and undermining a genuine 
advocacy approach, and I personally have called it 
"Kraft cheese advocacy", in analogy to the Kraft 
cheese commercials that in essence propose that one 
should take any kind of food and add cheese to it. 
Today, people would like to continue doing what they 
have always done, but add the word advocacy to it. 
In order to shed light on this confused scene, 
it is necessary to first clearly differentiate 
between advocacy and non-advocacy, and to secondly 
define various, and strikingly different, types of 
advocacy. 
All definitions are arbitrary. All one can do 
is offer for wider adoption a definition that has 
clarity and utility. The current affixation of the 
advocacy label to just about anything obviously loses 
both of the desirable attributes of any definition: 
clarity, and utility; other definitions might possess 
one but not both of these two desirable criteria. 
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It is useful to start with the culturally 
normative meaning of the noun or verb "advocate." 
As most people know, it comes from the Latin, and means 
to speak to a matter or issue. In time, it has come to 
mean speaking on the behalf of a person or issue; and 
where a person is involved, it almost invariably has 
come to mean speaking on the behalf of another person, 
rather than oneself. Of course, we often speak of 
self-advocacy, and that concept is certainly a 
legitimate one to which we shall return, especially 
when discussing the balance between the need for 
self-advocacy and other-advocacy. However, of 
necessity, we must focus primarily on advocacy on the 
behalf of others. Even when individuals band together 
in order to advocate on their own behalf, this type 
of advocacy becomes as much advocacy on behalf of an 
issue as on behalf of any one specific individual--
indeed, to the degree that each member of a self-
advocating group really advocates on behalf of an 
issue that benefits other members of his/her own 
group, and perhaps benefits them even more than 
oneself, this form of self-advocacy may actually 
be more other-advocacy than self-advocacy. 
Further, merely speaking on behalf of a person 
or group does not seem to be enough. After all, in 
the narrow and non-vigorous sense of the word "advocacy, " 
almost anyone can lay claim to being an advocate for 
all sorts of causes and other people. If somebody 
punches me in the nose and I shout "You shouldn't do 
things like that to other people," does that make me 
an advocate? Is it advocacy for the greater weal if 
I draw the attention of the welfare director to the 
fact that his office mistakenly mailed out a duplicate 
check to the same poor family? Is it not true that 
in a technical sense, perhaps every human service 
worker, every human service agency, every public official, 
every church, etc., could claim to be advocating? 
Obviously, much more is needed if the concept of 
advocacy is to hold the special meaning it is intended 
to convey. 
I propose that this "much more" consists of three 
components. The first one is vigor and vehemence. 
Speaking for someone in inaudible whispers is 
conscience-salving at worst and praye~ et best. Advocacy 
implies fervor and depth of feeling in advancing a cause, 
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or the interest of another person; it calls for doing 
more than what is done routinely, and what would be 
found rountinely acceptable; in this sense, the 
advocate acts at least as vigorously for another person 
or group as for him/herself. 
Secondly, I propose that even fervent advocacy is 
cheap advocacy if it costs nothing more significant 
than a shout here, a little excitement there, or a bit 
of traditional consideration and thoughtfulness. I 
propose that the essence of advocacy implies a distinct 
cost to the advocate. This distinct cost may involve 
any number of things: time that one would much rather 
have spent on something else; wear and tear on one's 
emotions, such as one would ordinarily avoid; investment 
of one's material substance and possessions; sacrifice 
of rest, sleep and/or recreation; etc. Indeed, the 
cost may involve one of the highest prices of advocacy, 
and that is risk, such as the risk of incurring 
resentment and hostility from others, of being ~aunted, 
or becoming an object of ridicule, of being considered 
foolish or crazy, of being rejected by one's peers and 
colleagues, of being in danger of loss of job; the 
risk may involve that of being hurt in violence, of loss 
of health--perhaps even loss of life itself. Indeed, 
without significant cost, an action should not be viewed 
as advocacy, or no more than Kraft cheese advocacy, 
even if it is otherwise valuable action, such as 
described in the next section. In fact, it is fervor 
and cost that may distinguish all sorts of protection 
from advocacy, in that protection may often be viewed 
as being, advocacy from which the cost has been 
removed--a burnt-out star that may have a lot of weight 
but no more fire. 
Thirdly, as seen from the preceding discussion of 
conflict of interest, whenever advocacy is intended to 
be defined as constituting a social institution (in the 
form of advocacy agencies, citizen advocacy, ombudsmanship, 
etc.), it must also be structured so as to be maximally 
free from conflict of interest. If it is not so 
structured, then the social institution that is being 
established sould be defined as not an advocacy institution, 
but as some other service quality safeguard, such as 
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discussed below. This is not to say that an individual 
worker in a non-advocacy type of social institution 
(e.g., agency) could not function as an advocate on 
some occasions by taking on a cause in a vigorous 
fashion and at significant personal cost, but the 
institution itself is not to be viewed as an advocacy 
institution. In fact, the advocacy action of one of 
its members constitutes an example. of an individual 
rising up against the strong anti-advocacy dynamics 
that have been imposed on and by his/her organization, 
thus constituting an exception to the prevailing 
forces and probabilities. 
So as to further sharpen our image of what advocacy 
is, we will now also review a number of activities that 
may be mistaken for, confused with, or called advocacy. 
Some of these may actually be advocacy under certain 
conditions, as when they meet the above criteria. 
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WHAT ADVOCACY IS NOT 
Not All Change Agentry is Advocacy 
In addition to emphasizing the other-directedness 
of much of tfle advocacy concept, I also propose that a 
major distinction must be made between those activities 
which are of a general change agentry nature, and those 
change agentry activities which indeed constitute advocacy. 
Too often, people equate all change-oriented activities 
with being advocacy; I do not. I can conceive of 
various types of developmental efforts, community 
organization, planning, training, and other change 
strategies that are most certainly strategies or tactics 
within the process of change, and that are designed to 
achieve a certain type of change objective, but that I 
do not view as constituting advocacy. For instance, a 
state/provincial department of human resources drawing 
up a plan to provide services for a particular group of 
persons in need does not necessarily constitute advocacy; 
in fact, the plan may actually embody just the opposite, 
in consciously or unconsciously regulating a group of 
people (such as the poor), in segregating and containing 
them (such as the mentally retarded), or in depriving 
them of privileges so as to transfer these privileges to 
other groups (as in the case of the elderly). 
Most Desirable and Sound Service System 
Quality Safeguards Are Not Advocacy 
There are numerous sound principles of service 
development, service operation, evaluation, organizational 
arrangements, etc., that should be adopted, and that would 
contribute significantly to service quality. Probably 
the bulk of these principles are not adopted--indeed, 
they are often not even studied or known; or if studied, 
they tend to be rejected or avoided. However, the point 
here is that most of these adaptive processes and 
structures are not of an advocacy nature, although it 
may take advocacy to attain their implementation. The 
nature of these safeguards will be discussed once more 
later in the paper. 
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However, it might be fit to mention here that 
"protection" (as in the concept of "advocacy and 
protection") is often not advocacy, even if it does 
protect. Both advocacy and protection are needed; 
sometimes they are the same; often they are not the 
same; and therefore, they certainly are not to be 
viewed as synonymous. Sometimes, that which is 
advanced as being protection could actually be termed 
to be "anti-advocacy" in nature. Even such an anti-
advocacy act as putting someone into prison may be 
defined as "protection", as in "protective custody." 
In fact, in traditional protective services and protective 
service legislation, the concept of "protection" has 
typically been saturated with overtones of physical 
custody of the person, typically in an institutional 
or quasi-institutional setting. The fact that this 
tradition has not died out is dramatically underlined 
by the 1977 Arkansas Adult Protective Services Act. 
It covers three forms of protective custody, and 
carries a strong flavour of being much more concerned 
with physical movement of a person from present abode 
to an agency type of abode, than with the types of 
social advocacy and protection that would be more 
likely to be carried out under the citizen advocacy 
schema. In other words, major concern seems to be 
placed upon removing a person from the environment 
in which abuse has occurred, rather than preventing 
abuse from occurring, or reversing it within that 
person's environment. 
Not Everything Good Is Advocacy 
Some people have become so enchanted with the 
word advocacy that they bestow it on anything they 
think is positive or benevolent. When a fraternity 
runs a fund-raising marathon, they may ca ll it 
advocacy; when a teacher teaches a child to read, 
that may be called advocacy; when a passer-by drops 
a dime into the Salvation Army kettle, he/she may 
consider that advocacy. Even ordinary professional 
services (supervising a workshop, giving counselling) 
may be called advocacy. 
Obviously, all this is Kraft cheese advocacy. 
Good intentions alone, nor even desirable actions, are 
not necessarily advocacy, as we shall see. 
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Case Work Can Rarely Be Advocacy 
Some people, and particularly social workers, 
rehabilitation counsellors, and similar personnel, 
seem particularly tempted to claim that case work-like 
professional services are, and perhaps a lways have 
been, advocacy, and that the more recent advocacy 
movement is really an unnecessary duplication of long-
standing efforts which, at most, need a little cleaning 
up in consciousness or efficiency. 
In my own experience of all types of human service 
agencies, residential institutions have been the most 
resistive to advocacy; and among human service 
professions, social work and medicine (including 
psychiatry) have been the most resistive. Perhaps 
the resistance from many professionals can be 
understood as a derivative of the above view of 
case work-type services already being advocacy. Later 
on, we will explain further why most such services 
are not and cannot be, and often should not be, 
advocacy. 
Everything that has been said so far, and that will 
be said below, does not deny that a staff member of a 
service agency might not be an advocate . However, in 
order to be an advocate, such a worker would usually 
have to act outside the scope of his/her agency and 
work role, and/or reject rather than implement its 
society-mandated policies--with all the risks 
pertaining to that. Of course, that is the point: 
no 'cost, such as risk, no advocacy. 
In-House "Advocacy" ls Not Advocacy 
In recognition of some of the dynamics briefly 
discussed in the historical review, many agencies or 
even service systems have established certain internal 
safeguards designed to protect the individuality of a 
consumer, to prevent a client from "getting lost" in 
the system, or to give consumers an easier internal 
route for voicing a grievance . Many of these safe-
guards may be called "ombudsmanship", although they 
are not at all what is understood to be the 
Scandinavian social-legal institution of the 
Ombudsman, as explained later. 
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The first type consists of an office with paid 
staff functioning as a sort of "inspector-general" to 
a whole service system. An example may be a nursing 
home Ombudsman for a whole state/province, functioning 
in the executive branch of government, usually the 
state/provincial office on aging or equivalent. 
The second type typically involves a single 
staff member (or a few members) within a specific 
a gency (e . g., within a single nursing home, or 
rehabilitation office), who is available to clients 
in order to check out grievances, bring problems to 
the director's attention, etc . This type of 
ombudsmanship is even less independent than the 
first one. 
The thi rd t ype involves the designation of 
different staff members within a specific agency as 
having a special responsibility for facilitating a 
specific client's progress through the agency. For 
instance, an attendant in an institution, a 
psychologist in a workshop, etc., may be charged with 
an extra-special concern with one or a few clients. 
Positions of this type are often called client advocate, 
patient advocate, counsellor advocate, staff advocate, 
in- house ombudsman, etc. 
Desirable as all of the above functions are, they 
are really clinical service provider, regulator, or 
funder functions, at best a step or two displaced 
from the service provider to the service regulator 
or funder. As such, they are not free from conflict 
of interest, and are therefore not real advocacy, 
underlining once more that not everything that is 
good and desirable is advocacy. Indeed, such in-house 
functions may operate under such poor ideology, or under 
such tremendous agency and agency system pressures, that 
they are totally non-functional, or merely enhance the 
image of the service system. Advocacy may be 
restricted to handing out "These Are Your Rights" 
booklets, or may even assume the role of "cooling off" 
criticism and defending the service provider. The mere 
fact that genuine advocacy may take place in some such 
arrangements at some point in time does not mean that 
the function itself is set up to be advocacy as it 
ought to be conceptualized and structured. 
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VARIOUS PAST APPROACHES TO PROTECTION AND 
GUARDIANSHIP,AND THEIR PROBLEMS 
Until relatively recently, much of what we now 
would subsume under advocacy was either 1) done 
informally and sporadically, 2) done by voluntary 
citizen action groups, mostly on a collective basis 
for the benefit of collectivities rather than 
individuals, or 3) subsumed under the concept of 
"protective service." While the first two ideas 
are fairly clear and well-recognized, the third one 
is not, and a brief analysis here is in order. 
The Background of Protective Services 
The advocacy concept has a number of ideological 
and historical roots. Certainly one of the most 
prominent of these must be the protective services 
concept which has led a not very prominent but 
nevertheless clearly identifiable existence in the 
human services context for quite some time. The 
basic idea that some people are so impaired as to 
need various forms of protection is as old as 
recorded history. Elizabeth Boggs (1966) pointed 
out that protective services for those who are 
not fully able to look after themselves or their 
affairs have their origins in the principle of 
"parens patriae." Ever since the Middle Ages, 
persons who have been deemed incompetent, as well 
as children, have been entitled to this special 
protection of the king and his successors in government. 
Unfortunately, not much progress has been made in the 
implementation of this principle in the past millennium. 
Indeed, with the rise of the principle of individual 
rights and its resultant limitations on the authority 
of government to intervene in personal and family 
affairs, the proper implementation of the principle 
of "parens patriae" in the case of those who need it 
has been impeded rather than fostered. 
In the United States (and I suspect in Canada as 
well), until just about a hundred years ago, little 
attention was paid to the principle even as it affected 
children. In 1875, a case of child abuse so offended 
moral sensibilities that some child protective services 
were begun. At about this time , some meager beginnings 
had also been made in protecting the retarded. mostly 
26 
-
by way of institutionalization . However, this philosophy 
of care quickly changed to one emphasizing the protection 
of society from retarded and other devalued individuals, 
and we have not yet fully emerged from this period. It 
is only within the past fifteen or so years that some 
attention has been focussed on the need for protective 
services for the aged. 
A useful operational definition is: protective 
services are those services and activities which are 
undertaken by the paid staff of an agency1<on behalf of 
other individuals who are not fully able to act for 
themselves. These protective services or activities 
are directed toward the individual's well-being, are 
backed up by legal sanctions, and are carried out by 
primarily social service techniques. A non-techni.cal 
way of thinking about a protective service is the 
provision of the kind of affectionate yet realistic 
on-going management and care that a good parent would 
exercise over a son or daughter. 
The Problems and the Desiderata of 
A Personal Protection Schema 
It is remarkable that when one reviews the various 
formal schemas designed to protect the interests of 
impaired individuals (as distinct from classes of 
people) around the world, they all seem to fit, at 
least approximately, into one of six categories, 
yielding nine variations. 
A. Guardianship of the person 
1. Individualized 
2. Collectivized (usually public) 
B. Guardianship of estate (property, income, etc.) 
1. Individualized 
2. Collectivized (usually public) 
C. Trusts 
1. Major insurance types 
2. Trivial, and usually collectivized, types 
* As discussed later, a protective service should 
be independent, and free from conflict of interest, 
but they are typically not so structured at present. 
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D. Case work-type protective agency services 
E. Informal relationship-based supports 
F. Combinations of some of the above 
Furthermore, there are also thirteen distinct 
types of problems or outright shortcomings that recur 
over and over, although different protective schemas 
may be bedevilled by different combinations of these 
problems: 
A. Stigmatizing incompetency procedures 
B. Built-in conflicts of interest 
1. Paid staff 
2. The protective advocacy agency may provide 
other direct services 
C. Impersonality of relationships 
1. One worker for many clients 
2. Discontinuity of personal relationships 
3. High likelihood of neglect of the 
expressive needs of impaired people 
4. Cumbersome bureaucracy 
D. Poor flexibility 
1. Only one or a few types of relationship 
roles available 
2. High likelihood of orientation to 
instrumental and crisis needs 
E. High potential of overprotection and over-
utilization, because of the administrative 
convenience of many schemas 
F. Danger of abuse, e.g., 
1. For social control 
2. To institutionalize impaired persons 
3. To ease parental anxiety, i.e., as 
"insurance" against future parental 
incapacity 
G. A tendency to rely on a single approach, 
even though no single schema is sufficient 
When I was unable to identify a single schema 
that was a) adequately comprehensive, b) satisfying 
in conceptualization and ideology, and c) actually 




the characteristics of an ideal schema, and it 
appeared that such a schema would have eleven 
characteristics: 
1. Separation from case work and other direct 
services 
2. Individualization of provisions 
3. Potential for long-term continuity of 
personal relationships 
4. Instrumental, expressive, and combined 
support options 
5. Both formal and informal relationship 
options 
6. Forms that are highly flexible, and easily 
changeable over time 
7. A built-in ideological orientation and 
commitment to the advocacy function 
8. Consistency with cultural values 
9. Maximally feasible freedom from conflict 
of interest 
10. Practical and feasible in implementation 
11. Available as needed 
It is out of these considerations, though 
initially not as systematized as I am presenting 
here, that starting in 1966 I evolved the citizen 
advocacy schema, which now needs to be reviewed 




A CITIZEN ADVOCACY OVERVIEW 
The Components of Citizen Advocacy 
Citizen advocacy (CA) was evolved in order to 
maximize as many of the above factors as possible. 
So citizen advocacy was defined as follows: an 
unpaid competent citizen volunteer, with the support of 
an independent citizen advocacy agency, represeRts--
as if they were his/her own--the interests of one or 
two impaired persons by means of one or several of 
many advocacy roles, some of which may last for life. 
In order to make this definition more intelligible, 
the schema can be conceptualized as having five 
cornerstones, as depicted in TabLe 1. 
Table 1 



















Role Subtypes , 
The top cornerstone refers to the one-to-one 
lationship by which a competent citizen volunteer, 
;eee from built-in conflicts of interest, advances 
~e welfare and interests of an impaired or limited 
;erson, as if that person's interests were the 
advocate's own. For ~a: k of a better term, _I have 
applied the word protege to the person who is 
presumed to be in need of significant unmet instrumental 
(practical problem-solving) or expressive (affective 
relationship) supports. The advocate is expected to 
use primarily culturally normative means that typically' 
are accessible to citizens generally, and that might 
in fact be widely practiced. 
The second cornerstone makes a critically 
important distinction between two major types 
of tasks, instrumental (problem-solving) and expressive 
(emotional-affective), a s explained in Table 2. The 
distinction between these tasks helps to structure 
relationships so as to provide only the minimally 
necessary type of supports, and to avoid both excessive 
as well as inadequate protection, both of which have 
so often been the hallmark of other gua rdianship/ 
protective-type schemas--particularly in public 
guardianship. The principle of minimal protection is 
implied in the theory of normalization (Wolfensberger, 
1972) and its corollary demand for en couraging 
maximal independence on the part of an impaired person. 
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Table 2 
The Distinction between Instrumental and Expressive Tasks 
Solving practical and 
material problems 
"Instrumental" tasks 








and the law 
Insure inclusion in 
appropriate services: 
training, work, education, 
etc. 
Meeting needs for 
communication, relationship, 
warmth, love & support 
"Expressive" tasks 
Provide emotional support 




Bring friendship and 




trips, and events 
Exchange meaningful tokens 
(mail, gifts, visits, or 





Meeting relationship needs while also working out practical 
problems 
"Instrumental-expressive" tasks 
Assume full or partial parental roles for dependent persons 
Share living quarters with a (young) adult 
Practical friendship to limited or disadvantaged persons 
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Perhaps the most perfect type of advocacy occurs 
~hen a citizen chooses to rear as his/her own, and 
perhaps adopt, a handicapped and neglected child. 
While few citizens can play such an ideal role, there 
are many other roles--in relation to adults as well as 
children--that are less demanding and yet much needed. 
Among these are the provision of transportation, 
counsel, or other services for the handicapped child 
of a family who love and accept the child, but lack the 
means to solve the child's problems.* An advocate can 
make certain that the child gets the education and 
training which the community has a responsibility to 
provide. Advocates can sponsor institutionalized 
children without (adequate) family ties by visiting 
them, giving them gifts, or taking them on trips or 
to entertainments and even assuming guardianship or 
at least trying to protect their welfare and rights. 
Handicapped adults can be assisted in such practical 
matters as managing money, finding and maintaining 
living quarters, securing jobs, learning how to use 
transportation services, and how to vote. Citizen 
advocates can give friendship and emotional support by 
offering companionship, and by sharing worship or the 
observance of holidays and special occasions. 
A person who is returning from the institution 
to live in a community group home or apartment needs 
a wide range of social experiences in the community. 
A special relationship is desirable for practically 
all such persons, since group home or other agency 
personnel must spread their relationships across so 
many individuals. An advocate for a young handicapped 
adult can contribute much to the successful 
adjustment or readjustment of his/her protege, keeping 
him/her out of trouble, teaching him/her how to use 
free time well, and offering advice and support in time 
* Such actions should not be offered or viewed 
as a substitute for services that are or should be the 
responsibility of service agencies, but as either 
temporary stopgaps, or enrichments. Advocates must 
resist the temptation to become long-term providers 
of free services that should be rightfully available, 
and/or to have their efforts diverted from obtaining 
for their protege the services that others should provide. 
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of stress and crisis. Young handicapped adults and 
advocates of the same age can share apartments, with 
the advocate providing the skills and fellowship that 
make more independent apartment living possible for the 
handicapped roommate. 
Many parents of impaired children are quite willing 
and capable of looking after the interests of their 
child, but have great fears and misgivings about their 
child's future once their health declines or they pass 
away. Citizen advocacy can be the means of providing 
parental successors who would continue to give 
compassionate, individualized attention to the impaired 
person, and who would try to preserve the general type 
and quality of life that the child enjoyed when his/her 
parents looked after his/her interests. 
Advocates are especially needed as "watchdogs" of 
agencies that serve their proteges, preventing such 
agencies from "passing the buck," and keeping them 
relevant, change-oriented, and honest. Particularly 
in large cities or in large agencies, an individual 
client may soon lose his/her identity, or may actually 
be forgotten. 
The various advocacy tasks need to be carried out 
via a wide variety of advocate roles, as indicated by 
the third cornerstone and Table 3. Some of these roles 
are informal, and it is neither necessary nor 
desirable that they be recognized by law. Other roles 
and related aspects do require legal recognition, and 
this brings us to the fourth cornerstone. While the 
initiation of citizen advocacy would not require 
legislation in most countries, the schema could be 
greatly facilitated if the widest possible range of 
legal options and supports were available . These 
include carefully designed guardianship proceedings 
safeguards; periodic and meaningful review of existing 
guardianships; a wide range of options for limited 
guardianships of either the person, the person's 
property, or a combination thereof; various parental 
and guardianship successorship options; clearer 
provisions for guardianship ad litem; and subsidies 
for the adoption of handicapped children. 
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Table 3 








Both Instrumental & Expressive 
Adoptive Parent 
(Formal) Parental or Guardianship Successor 
(Formal) Instrumental-·Expressive Guardian 




There is an inescapable conflict between too 
much and too little advocacy. In citizen advocacy, the 
ideal is "minimal advocacy" (just as much help as is 
needed but no more), in contrast to other services 
which usually emphasize that more is better. Traditionally, 
handicapped people have never had enough advocacy, and 
yet there are people who carry the idea of minimal 
advocacy to the point where they may deny legal guardianship 
to people who need it. But if a person is impaired in 
competency, there must be someone who will make wise 
and kind decisions for that person, if need be throughout 
his/her life. 
Contrary to much misinterpretation, citizen advocacy 
was never designed to exclude guardianship. Quite the 
opposite is true. The need for formal guardianship, or 
some version thereof, was one of the reasons for the 
original conceptualization of the citizen advocacy 
schema. An advocate can be a guardian or a conservator, 
and not cease being an advocate. Not understanding this, 
people sometimes speak in terms of a program being either 
citizen advocacy or guardianship; the correct phrasing 
would distinguish between advocates in informal roles in 
comparison to advocates in formal (i.e., legal) roles. 
Citizen advocacy offices are therefore expected to 
consciously and non-apologetically recruit guardians. 
It is also incorrect to assume that those citizen 
advocates who hold a formal role such as guardianship 
or conservatorship are somehow unaccountable, therefore 
apt to misuse their office, and therefore dangerous. 
Quite to the contrary: a citizen advocate in a formal 
role is not only in every way as accountable to the 
courts as is any guardian or conservator, but is 
doubly monitored, as well as supported, by additionally 
having the citizen advocacy office look over his/her 
shoulders, offer guidance and referral, etc. Moreover, 
it is hoped that some of the other safeguards that are 
desirable in a balanced schema, and that are discussed 
in this monograph, would also be operational, and would 
constitute yet additional back-ups, lines of defenses, 
and mutual monitoring. 
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The fifth and final cornerstone is a practical 
implementive administrative mechanism which brings the 
schema to life on a day-to-day basis. While the efforts 
of citizen volunteers are noble and desirable, they 
are not sufficient to sustain a balanced, successful, 
major and systematic service form unless coordinated 
and backed-up by staffed local or regional advocacy 
offices. Such an advocacy office or staff would not 
carry out advocacy functions directly, but instead 
would attract, select, orient, guide, and reinforce 
volunteer citizen advocates, and match them with 
protlges on the basis of criteria such as commitment 
to the advocacy concept, willingness to undergo 
orientation and preparation for advocacy tasks, 
competence in the chosen advocacy area, good character, 
likely continuity and stability in the community and 
in a relationship, and possibly, willingness to join 
a relevant community citizen's action group. The office 
would assess the needs of a person for advocacy, as well 
as the ability of a citizen volunteer to contribute 
through advocacy. It would train advocates, emphasizing 
commitment to the advocacy concept, understanding of 
the impaired person and the services of potential use 
to him/her, and many other areas of action. Finally, 
advocacy offices would provide emotional and 
practical assistance, support, and back-up to advocates, 
and mediate legal and professional services that may 
be needed by the advocate and his/her protege. While 
all the advocates must be unpaid volunteers, it is 
of critical importance to the success of the schema 
that the advocacy office have at least one paid staff 
member who would be available at any time. Without 
the functions of this office, and without proper 
matching, citizen advocacy would be equivalent to 
"ordinary spontaneous everyday moral behaviour," but 
relationships would be less likely to last for long 
periods. would not reach the numbers of persons that 
can be reached, and would not make the service of 
advocates as effective as it might be. 
Since an advocate must sometimes represent the 
interests of his/her protege vis-a-vis a service-
rendering agency, an advocacy office ideally should be 
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independently financed and affiliated. Except for 
initial funding purposes, an advocacy office should 
never be under the aegis of an agency whose clients 
might become prot~ges. Among the desirable alternatives 
is for voluntary citizen action groups (associations in 
the field of mental retardation, aging, cerebral 
palsy, mental health, etc.) to hand over their direct 
services (if any) to public or quasi-public agencies 
and to operate advocacy offices instead. Many avenues 
for funding of such offices suggest themselves. 
(See Wolfensberger, 1973, for an extensive analysis 
of change and advocacy rather than service provision 
roles of voluntary associations.) 
While most advocacy relationships will be informal 
and have no special status or standing in law, as a 
volunteer activity, citizen advocacy is profoundly 
different from programs which employ (i.e., hire) 
people to be advocates, either exclusively (for 
example, ombudsmen, full-time staff advocates), or 
as part of their function within an agency. Equally 
profound is the difference from traditional forms of 
volunteer activities where individuals perform 
unpaid work for~ service agency . Whatever the citizen 
advocate's role or legal status, in each case, he/she 
is an independent citizen volunteer whose primary 
loyalty is to his/her protege, not to an agency. All 
direct relationships are carried on a voluntary basis, 
leaving only initiation, coordination, and supportive 
functions to be performed by a relatively small paid 
office staff. 
Many aspects of citizen advocacy have been elaborated 
in both theory and practice, and are discussed in more 
detail in Wolfensberger (1975) and Wolfensberger and 
Zauha (1973). For instance, a number of crisis versions 
of citizen advocacy have been established, as well 
as two-to-one and one-to-two relationships (dispersed 
and multiple advocacy respectively). Also, the 
advocate associate role has been defined as one which 
provides support to an advocate or advocacy office 
withou~ actually being part of a one-to-one relationship; 
many agency professionals would fall into this 
category . A particularly promising version of citizen 
advocacy is youth advocacy, especially where the impaired 
person is also a youth or a child. 
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Strengths and Limitations of Citizen Advocacy 
Citizen advocacy has the following eight 
advantages or strengths: 
1. It combines the strengths of several other 
systems while avoiding some of their shortcomings. 
2. 'Reasonable probabilities for continuity 
and practicality of protection and advocacy exist, 
due to the back-up of volunteer advocates by paid 
staff. 
3. Conflicts of interest are probably as low 
as any schema can make them. 
4. There is a highly individualized range of 
advocacy options. 
5. Most types of needs can be met via informal 
relationships. 
6. There is a reasonable likelihood that where 
needed, long-term relationships will exist, whether 
formal or informal. 
7. The cost is relatively low, especially if 
compared to some other schemas. 
8. It has proven success, with almost 200 
operational citizen advocacy offices across North 
Anerica by early 1977. 
Like any human endeavor, citizen advocacy also 
has its shortcomings and built-in limitations. Some 
are inherent, some are circumstantial. Inherently, 
1) citizen advocacy cannot replace all other forms 
of advocacy/protection; 2) it will probably never 
be able to meet all of the demand, due to the limited 
supply of volunteers; and 3) it does not and should 
not have more than culturally typical social control 
over the established relationships. Circumstantially, 
1) it is very difficult to persuade implementors to 
preserve and pursue sound ideological as well as 
practical principles; 2) there is a tendency to 
over-emphasize informal, reciprocal, and expressive 
or instrumental-expressive relationships; 3) it 
is difficult to get funding that is not tainted with 
conflicts of interest, and 4) sometimes, opposition 
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to citizen advocacy increases as it becomes more 
successful and effective. Particularly in regard 
to No. 2, much can be learned from the 
experience of the nearly 200 citizen advocacy 
offices to date. There has been a tendency to 
assign advocates to the more "interesting," more 
verbal, more affectional and lovable people in need. 
In consequence, the pool of potential advocates was 
often drained of advocates who might have taken on 
the interests of those persons who may have needed 
advocacy the most: those who are noncommunicative, 
profoundly impaired, unattractive for some reason, 
institutionalized, totally abandoned, etc. This 
issue has been confronted in more recent workshops 
and discussions in the citizen advocacy movement, 
and more intensive coverage is more relevant to 
citizen advocacy personnel and committee workers 
than to the probably more broadly-oriented reader 
of this paper. 
Agency response to citizen advocacy can take 
a wide range of forms, from one extreme of 
rejection and hostility, to the other extreme of 
not only support but even maladaptive idealization. 
In the latter instance, citizen advocacy may be 
seen as a panacea solution to all the problems of 
all individuals and all services, and even as a 
dumping ground onto which are dumped all the clients 
with whom the agencies cannot cope and with whom 
they do not know what to do. 
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A GLOBAL MULTI-COMPONENT SCHEMA OF ADVOCACY/PROTECTION 
IN RELATION TO A HUMAN SERVICE SYSTEM 
In synthesis of all of the foregoing considerations, a 
global schema is sketched herewith that attempts to 1) put 
advocacy in its proper relationship to the delivery of 
human (primarily clinical) services, and to service-related 
change agentry, and that 2) contains several major types of 
advocacy, clarified in relation to each other and to the 
services system. However, prior to sketching this schema, 
it is helpful to 1) state some basic assumptions in addition 
to those already reviewed above under what advocacy is and 
is not, and 2) offer a taxonomy of different types of ad-
vocacy. 
Some Basic Assumptions Underlying the Proposed Global Model 
Some of the basic assumptions underlying the global bal-
anced multi-component advocacy/protection schema are as 
follows. 
1. There is rarely a need to conduct demographic surveys, 
needs assessments, and similar data collections in order to 
adaptively plan and initiate an advocacy/protection schema. 
The needs are crying to high heaven. They are obvious to 
any informed person of good will on the scene. A handful of 
informed activists can provide more meaningful information 
on needs in a few minutes than can costly, time-consuming 
formalistic surveys which often play only the function of 
delay and diversion. 
There are only two valid functions for needs-type 
surveys: to legitimize the efforts in the eyes of powerful 
people who have invincible faith in the need of surveys and 
data; and for the sake of refining an advocacy/protection 
schema that has been functional for some time, and that has 
met some of the more obvious and blatant needs. In the 
former case, cheaply-collected "junk data" should be pro-
vided, since genuinely valid data surveys typically take 
years to collect, must involve huge population bases, and 
would cost up to millions of dollars. In the latter case, 
data collection should be built into the provision of 
advocacy/protection, and be an integral on-going part of 
operations. 




social problems or abuse is extremely limited. A mis-
conception seems to be currently sweeping the U.S. at 
least that solutions to human service problems lie in the 
law. More and more laws are being passed, they are be-
coming longer and more complex, and in many instances, 
less enforceable and less respected. In a society where 
almost all social "glues" (i.e., stabilizing social in-
stitutions) are corning apart, people are turning to liti-
gation to resolve problems which are not resolvable be-
cause the social preconditions do not exist. The only 
significant legal solution that seems to have emerged 
from the recent human service litigation craze, and that 
seems to be working to any degree in human services today 
(and even that only minimally), is some of the right-to-
education rulings, The underlying problem with seeking 
legislative, litigative, or related judicial solutions is 
that what the culture does not have, or is unwilling to 
give, cannot be won by law or in a court of law. By and 
large, the law does what the culture wants it to do, and a 
lot of things we are asking from the law in the courts are 
things society cannot, and does not want to give.* In 
consequence, a legal advocacy/protection approach is in-
sufficient, and should be vj_ewed more as an adjunct to a 
social solution rather than the other way around. 
The above has many implications to the strategies 
and priorities of advocacy/protection development, many 
of these touched on later in this paper. For instance, 
one must carefully distinguish between lawsuits that can 
be won versus those that cannot; between those that can 
be won, but at too high a price; and between those that 
will probably lose but are worth pursuing. Among the 
latter might be legal actions that attempt no more than 
to make a prophetic statement, such as trying to prevent 
the legalized destruction of handicapped people. My 
general recommendation is to use litigation minimally and 
extremely sparingly. 
*Fora lengthier exposition on the "Limits of the 
Law," the reader is referred to an audio cassette re-
cordj_ng of the author's presentation before the Canadian 
Association for the Mentally Retarded annual convention 
in Ottawa, 1976. Available from the National Institute 
on Mental Retardation, 4700 Keele St,, Downsvj_ew, Ontario, 
M3J 1P3, Canada 
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3. There is such a thing as conflict of interest, 
it is universal, it is even more vexing in advocacy/ 
protection than in other services, it cannot be fully 
eliminated, but it must be reduced to the minimum. 
There must be separation of advocacy/protection from 
service delivery, separation of some safeguards from 
each other, and additional problems discussed above 
and below must be addressed aggressively rather than 
denied and circumvented. 
Some people have difficulty understanding the 
relevance of the conflict of interest issues, as 
discussed at the beginning of this essay, to 
advocacy and protection, namely, that when one enters 
any kind of direct service (case work, rehabilitation 
counselling, etc.), one should not be one's client's 
guardian or guardian equivalent (e.g., as "parent 
surrogate"). It used to be, for example, that 
institution superintendents were guardians for 
residents--sometimes for thousands of residents. 
However, the interests of the agency and the worker 
may not be the interests of the client. Therefore, 
a client's guardian should be a person who is not 
caught in this web; and who not only is not 
caught, but is not likely to be caught. Indeed, 
there should not even be the temptation of being 
caught in dual roles. Yet in California and elsewhere, 
regional centers have been established where the 
caseworkers have been appointed as guardians of the 
people whom they serve in a casework capacity. 
Willowbrook used to be the largest institution 
in the world for the mentally retarded. In 1970, 
120 residents died there--an extraordinary number in 
one year--8 of them choking to death on their own 
vomit. Two staff members urged the parents of the 
children to campaign for better conditions at the 
institution; the two were fired. While this was 
going on, the superintendent of Willowbrook, who 
was one of only ten members of the Accreditation 
Council for Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 
(of the Joint Commission of Accreditation of Hospitals), 
was the legal guardian of many residents in the 
institution. Many people have known and stated for 
years that a superintendent should never be the 
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guardian of his/her institutional residents, yet 
that used to be the standard operating procedure. 
If someone administers a large institution and at 
the same time tries to be a guardian of the people 
who live there, obviously there will be conflicts 
of interest. A person's interest cannot be rep-
resented by the same person who needs to be advocated 
against. How can the interests of a person who was 
choked to death be represented by the person who has 
done, supervised, or administered the choking? 
One reason why so much clinical and agency 
service should not be advocacy is simply this: 
society, as well as individual citizens or agency 
clients, needs its own representatives to execute 
its duly selected policies. That which is in 
the interest of a citizen may not be in the interest 
of society, and a society which failed to constitute 
proper bodies to execute and protect its larger 
policies would be an unfit society . Thus, while 
citizens and clients need advocates to represent 
them as individuals, so society needs organizations, 
agencies, and even advocates to represent its 
interests, or at least to carry out its policies 
even if these are not necessarily optimal. Even 
non-optimal societal policies may be legitimate--
much as any administrator must be given allowance 
for making legitimate mistakes. 
Since there is every reason to posit that the 
interests of an individual and the interests of 
society are not always identical or even compatible, 
a balanced advocacy/protection schema needs to 
include independent and forceful representation of 
the interests of the individual, as well as those 
of society. Also, there needs to be greater clarity 
and honesty as to whose interests are being 
represented by different helping or advocacy forms, 
and an elimination of those conflicts of interest 
that do not have to exist. 
Not only is personal advocacy incompatible with 
the delivery of direct clinical services to a person, 
but the incompatibility extends even to systemic 
advocacy, and to systemic development in general. It 
is well know that if a program is set up that 
attempts to serve both clinical and systemic ends, 
clinical services will almost inevitably drive out 
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systems development. It would be a giant leap forward 
if that fact were more widely acknowledged. If it 
were, no voluntary association for the retarded 
would be delivering direct clinical-professional 
services any more. But they do not recognize the 
universal dynamic that, the moment they deliver a 
clinical service, there is a conflict of interest 
with the advocacy function, and plain technical 
difficulties in playing a monitoring or futurism 
role (Wolfensberger, 1973). Furthermore it is not 
even good enough not to have a conflict of interest; 
there must not even be the appearance of conflict 
of interest. As they said of Caesar's wife, she must 
not only be innocent, she must be above suspicion. 
The same applies to advocacy and advocates . 
One may very well advocate on behalf of one's 
service client, but as a service worker, one should 
not be the advocate for that person if one has any 
conflicts of interest that are built into the 
worker and/or client role. Whether one feels 
conflicted or free is totally irrelevant~at 
matters is whether the mutual role relationship is 
one that is structured so as to have reduced the 
potential conflicts to their humanly irreducible 
minimum. 
Consequently, if one is to have advocacy that 
is independent, any such type of advocacy function 
needs to be funded from sources not under the control 
of people or agencies toward whom advocacy efforts 
might be directed. A major rule of thumb is that 
advocacy funding sources should be as many links, 
steps, levels, etc., removed from potential targets 
of advocacy as possible: and/or that as many cushions 
and safeguards be interposed between the advocacy 
carrier, and the control that potential advocacy 
targets can exert over advocacy funds. When advocacy 
funds do come from potential advocacy targets, the 
"organizational distance" these funds traverse should 
be as long as possible, because more safeguards or at 
least options can be built in. For example, in one 
state, local citizen advocacy services were funded 
by a state citizen advocacy office, which was 




action group, which was funded for advocacy by an 
office of state government which was three levels 
above the local service level at which citizen 
advocates might occasionally confront service agencies 
and workers. If such a local agency were inclined 
to try to squash advocacy against some of its own practices 
then there would be a lot of cooling-off distance 
to traverse; and in the meantime, the benefits of 
some advocacy actions might be seen as worth the 
inconvenience of others because complaints would be 
more likely to be perceived systemically, rather than 
uniquely one at a time. 
However, the danger in a state/provincial office 
of a voluntary association assuming the advocacy 
function when its local units have not made the 
commitment to phasing out direct services is that the 
state/provincial office may find itself in the 
position of conflict with one of its own local 
units, and the local unit may cut not only its 
affiliation but also its funding to the state/ 
provincial organization, which may threaten the 
survival of the state/provincial organization. 
The situation might be tolerable if the service-
providing units were small, and any conflict with 
th8 state/provincial office would not threaten 
the survival of the state/provincial organization. 
But if local units were large and had a lot of 
money, the threat would be powerful. In those 
circumstances, perhaps another body would have to 
be sought out or created for the advocacy function. 
While remoteness of funding is often acceptable, 
it is not the most ideal solution. The operation of 
an advocacy service is one instance where independence 
is the ultimate need. Consequently and optimally, 
private funds ought to be used for the private 
(or at most quasi-public) operation of many types of 
advocacy services, instead of using private funds, 
as is often the case now, for services that ought 
to be publicly funded and provided as a right. In 
New York State, there are private organizations 
that go out and raise money to give to the state 
institutions that are already funded massively from 
the state, to the tune of over $30,000 per resident 
per year in some of the worst institutions of the state. 
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such use of private funds is a perversion. However, 
federal funding of citizen advocacy offices may be 
viable because of the remoteness of such funds, even 
though the federalization of most other human services 
is extremely maladaptive. Also, there are some 
instances where an advocacy project may be entered into 
by a service provider as long as there is a time-linked 
action commitment (not just an intent or promise) to 
phase out the clinical service. In such situations, 
the conflict dynamics during the phasing out of the 
clinical service can be tolerated for perhaps a year 
or two. 
Elsewhere (Zauha & Wolfensberger, 1973) a number 
of mechanisms have been laid out that are apt to 
keep unavoidable conflicts of interest created by 
funding or administrative/governance structures to 
a minimum. A final point of caution here is that 
a conflict of interest, or at least a disincentive, may 
be created if a protective service is permitted to 
charge clients for its services. If one needs a 
protective service, one may be reluctant to ask for 
it because one (or one's estate) may get charged for it. 
4. Because there is an incompatible conflict 
of interest between advocacy/protection and social 
service delivery, the two need to be organizationally 
separate, especially since publicly-funded agencies 
are first and foremost the representatives of society, 
carry out societally-determined policy, and often 
(perhaps even predominatly, not merely occasionally) 
do not constitute a primary or even any representation 
of a client's interest. Therefore, all advocacy/ 
protection forms should be administratively and 
financially separate from agency structures that deliver 
other services, especially clinical ones. Relatedly, 
the funding source for advocacy/protection services 
should be as far removed (in terms of agencies, 
governmental units, levels therein, etc.) as possible. 
5. Similarly, many advocacy/protection forms are 
incompatible with each other, and need to be separated 
at least administratively from each other, even if not 
always financially. For example, advocacy on behalf 
of an individual is highly distinct from advocacy for 
a class of persons. In fact, the interests of an 
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individual are not always identical or even compatible 
with those of a class to which he/she may be seen as 
belonging. However, while individual and collective 
advocacy may be able to coexist, more urgent is the 
separation of voluntary from paid individual advocacy. 
Because of reasons spelled out elsewhere in this paper, 
paid personal advocacy will tend overwhelmingly to 
drive out volunteer personal advocacy. 
6. Some proposed schemas recommended that an 
advocacy system be attached to (in the sense of 
directed toward) a particular agency or service 
structure, such as perhaps a particular residential 
institution. But advocacy and protection should 
follow the person in need, and not the agency. If 
advocacy is attached to a service instead of to a 
person, then whenever a person leaves that agency, 
that person needs a different advocate, and this 
creates yet additional discontinuity in the already 
fragmented lives of impaired people. The major 
advocacy process needs to be person-tied, and if 
there is advocacy built into a particular agency, 
then that is additional icing on the cake. Anything 
one might want to accomplish by attaching advocacy 
to an agency can be accomplished by attaching other 
non-advocacy safeguards (such as external evaluation, 
as discussed further below) to that agency instead. 
7. The least restrictive advocacy/protection 
option is preferrable. Among other things, this 
implies that where feasible: 
a) a citizen-volunteer solution is preferred 
to an agency-professional one; 
b) an informal (non-legal) option is preferrable 
to a legal one. 
8. Every person who is impaired in his/her 
ability to independently establish a relationship 
that offers support, or who is physically or mentally 
impaired, who is abandoned, or seriously disadvantaged, 
should be assisted in establishing a needed relationship. 
More specifically, if a person is a minor, or an 
adult with major impairment in competency, such a 
person should have an individualized guardian who is 
interested in him/her and committed to his/her mission, 
and as much as possible free from conflicts of interest. 
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Th e guardianship should be of a type that is "minimal," 
1,e., commensurate with the needs of the person, but 
not more restrictive than need be. 
9. There probably cannot be effective and 
meaningful self- advocacy in a system that does not 
contain strong other-advocacy. One reason is that if 
no one has sufficient compassion to advocate for 
others, no one will care enough to want to teach 
self-advocacy to other people. Secondly, a severely 
l imited person learns self-advocacy best within the 
demanding shelter, protection, love and friendship 
of a citizen advocacy relationship, because these 
processes are especially apt to bring the person 
t oward growth and independence. Thirdly, teaching 
people self-advocacy when the teachers do not 
practice or believe in other-advocacy is not honest, 
and "phony" helping forms rarely work, if ever. 
Therefore, training for self-advocacy should generally 
be tied to established and successful citizen advocacy, 
and the more so the more impaired the persons in 
need of advocacy are. 1bis principle has 
particularly forceful relevance in the areas of 
mental disorder and mental retardation. 
10. Whenever advocacy really begins to work, 
i t will be persecuted, because it will be a threat. 
Conversely, the phonier an advocacy or protective 
system i s , the more likely it is to be praised, 
l egitimized, exalted and funded. 
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A Classification of Advocacies 
The large number of advocacies that have been 
defined (or at least "called out") is very confusing, 
e.g., what is "systems advocacy," "ombudsmanship," 
"staff advocacy," etc. In order to differentiate the 
jungle of advocacy terms, it is proposed that all 
advocacies can be classified according to five (or 
at least four) criteria. 
1. Who is the advocacy for? Some forms of 
advocacy are addressed to individuals (citizen advocacy, 
Ombudsman, etc.), some to groups (e.g., collective 
corporate advocacy for the elderly, such as the 
Grey Panthers). Some collective advocacies are 
self-help, others are mixed or totally other-directed. 
2. What is being advocated for? Some forms 
of advocacy are designed to prevent abuse, some 
to obtain legal rights, some to implement the 
principle of normalization, etc. 
3. Who or what is the advocacy aimed "against"? 
e.g., the Ombudsman may only investigate public 
officials and public services, while specific 
watchdog committees may be aimed solely at specific 
agencies. This criterion has the lowest identi.ty 
of the five, and could conceivably be subsumed 
under the second one. 
4 . Who is doing the advocating? It might be 
an agency via its employees, an independent citizen 
volunteer, a collectivity of citizen volunteers, etc. 
5. How is the advocacy accomplished or 
transacted? Major approaches might be legal means; 
"for-speakership," informal personal persuasion, or 
other forms of positive social influence; confrontation; 
threat; violence and warfare; etc. 
Theoretically, then, one could conceptualize 
a five-dimensional "cube" in which all forms of advocacy 
could be entered at least three times (who is 
advocating, for whom, and how). 
The above clarification of terms permits one to 
see some advocacies in a new light. For instance, 
one can now perceive that legal advocacy is really 
not a legitimate concept except when it is used as 
one methodology within category 1, 2, or 3. 
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The Four Essential Advocacy/Protection 
Components in Relation to the Service System 
In order to gain a total overview of all of the 
proposed components, the reader should refer repeatedly 
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To begin, it is necessary to reiterate the 
distinction between personal vs. collective, i.e., 
clinical vs. systemic, needs. When a person, as 
~ individual, needs a service, protection, 
representation, or emotional support, these should 
be provided by one or a combination of 1) clinical 
service and/or case work agencies, and 2) one of 
the individual advocacy/protection forms, such as 
citizen advocacy, ombudsmanship, or protective 
service, as explained further below. However, 
should the person be one of a class of persons with 
significant unmet needs, then regardless of whether 
any or all of the four functions above come into 
play, the functions of collective advocacy and/or 
other forms of change agentry should also be available. 
The typical non-advocacy human services (healing, 
teaching, training, counselling, habilitating, 
employing, housing, etc.) should be rendered via 
structures (mostly agencies) whose major mandate is 
to carry out societal service policy, and who are 
funded and regulated accordingly. Especially 
professional counselling and case work, regardless of 
what it is called, should be vested in service 
agencies in which workers are paid to carry out such 
a service. 
The fact that the above services might be 
improved by a consolidation of agencies, and/or by 
their much more forceful coordination is important, 
but not relevant to the conceptualization of the 
schema presented here, except that a major planning 
and change agentry function should be vested in 
bodies (preferrably and perhaps even essentially 
regional in nature) that have various types of 
binding authority that will not be explicated 
further here. 
Ombudsmanship on the Swedish Model 
In regard to the four advocacy/protection forms 
that are here proposed as "essential," at this point 
in time, every state/province should first of all have 
or install a generic Ombudsman's office, patterned 
after the classical Swedish model. The Ombudsman's 
office must be established by law, and should be 
attached to the legislature; any citizen should have 
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free access to complain about illegal , incorrect, 
discourteous, arbitrary or outright corrupt treatment 
by any public official. The Ombudsman should have 
total access to public documents and officials, the 
right to reprimand public officials, and the duty to 
report findings and recommendations annually to the 
legislature. 
The structural characteristics of the Ombudsman's 
office include the following. The offi ce is external 
to the services its investigates, and is attached by 
appointment to the legislative (not the executive) 
branch of government. The Ombudsman is protected 
by a tenure (usually 5 years) during which time(s) 
he/she cannot be fired except by impeachment 
procedures similar to those for a superior court 
judge. The Ombudsman's office has unlimited access 
to public documents, and has subpoena power over 
evidence, thus overcoming secrecy that now exists 
under the guise of "confidentiality of records." 
The office is open and accessible to all citizens. 
For example, a prison administration could not censor 
a letter written to the Ombudsman's office by a 
prisoner. If that letter were opened, the prison 
administration would stand in contempt. Preferrably , 
the Ombudsman uses informal, direct, speedy and cheap 
methods: conferring with an official, informal 
discussions and hearings, etc. Quite often, a letter 
of inquiry will settle a problem because officials 
will have a healthy respect for the Ombudsman's 
office. When the Ombudsman takes a course of action, 
there must always be a clear detailed explanation of 
the issue. For example, if the Ombudsman reprimands 
a public official for being discourteous to 
citizens, the Ombudsman would have to explain the 
exact basis for the complaint . 
Common functions of the Ombudsman are the 
conduct of impartial and neutral investigations; the 
objective evaluation of facts to discover both 
justified and unjustified complaints and harassments, 
and possibly to defuse unjust allegations; use of 
public opinion and of the power of the prestige of 
the office, in order to enhance the status or a 
complainant (such as a minority member of a handicapped 
person) vis-a-vis public structures; and being 
sensitive to patterns of problems, and drawing attention 
to these patterns. 
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The ideal personal characteristics of the Ombudsman 
are: independence, both in character and in office; 
no conflicts of interest; impartiality ("judicial 
temperament") and political neutrality; expertise 
regarding the government; tact and diplomacy; 
universal accessibility; and a reputation of integrity, 
prestige and discretion. This is why traditionally, 
the Ombudsman is a person near the end of his/her 
career who has no other (e.g., political) ambitions, 
and is respected by the public. 
The concept of the Ombudsman has deep appeal, 
and should be relatively easy to implement, as shown 
by the fact that in a relatively short period of time, 
many states/provinces have adopted it by law. Also, 
one of the benefits of the Ombudsman is that it is a 
generic service: a citizen can go with a complaint 
against a public human service agency as readily as 
one can go with a complaint against any other public 
service, such as the sewer system. By being generic, 
it defuses the stigma of a great many advocacy 
schemas which are either tied unequivocally to 
devalued people, or are marginal, such as protective 
services. Relatedly, the Ombudsman system benefits 
our elephantine society. According to testimony from 
Sweden, Swedish democracy might not have worked had 
it not been for the institution of the Ombudsman. 
The creation of the Ombudsman-is only one of 
many safeguards, and would not solve all problems. 
One limitation is that the Ombudsman has no administrative 
power; he/she cannot tell anybody what to do. The power 
of the office is entirely persuasive and revelatory. 
The Ombudsman can only reveal and admonish, and make 
recommendations to the legislature in a 'yearly 
report, which the legislature may either accept or 
reject. Also, it has no reach-out mandate, and only 
swings into action if citizens call upon it. 
Several excellent descriptions and establishment 
laws already exist (e.g., the Public Protector law of 
Quebec). The point is that such a generic Ombudsman 
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can be utilized on behalf of impaired persons as 
much as by anyone else; the regrettable fact is that 
in the many states/provinces where this most 
valuable resource already exists, hardly any use of 
it has been made by or for impaired persons.* 
The reader is warned not to confuse or equate 
the public legislative Ombudsmanship with Ombuds-
manship, i.e., informal "for-speakership," the 
establishment of a sort of administrative "inspector-
general" for a particular category of agencies 
(e.g., nursing homes), or with any number of other 
arrangements already discussed (e.g., in-house 
staff "advocacy") that have been given the name 
"Ombudsmanship." 
Citizen Advocacy 
Next, citizen advocacy, including its formal versions 
(guardianship, etc.) should be vested in inde·pendent 
private voluntary action bodies which are incorporated, 
and which may not engage in other types of direct 
clinical services that might give rise to conflicts 
of interest. However, the action body that operates 
a citizen advocacy service might conceivably operate 
other services that do not constitute a source of 
conflict of interest, although this situation would 
be unusual, and should be rare. Furthermore, the 
action body might be engaged in certain other forms of 
advocacy and/or change agentry, although this may 
not always be wise. Finally, there is no ideological 
(though perhaps there may be a practical) reason 
why there may not be a multiplicity of ci-tizen 
advocacy services operated by different bodies in 
the same region, e.g., citizen advocacy for the 
developmentally impaired, for prisoners, etc. 
* This was underlined at a meeting of The 
Canadian Ombudsmans at the 1976 convention in 
Ottawa of the Canadian Association for the 
Mentally Retarded. The proceedings are available 
on audiotape from the National Institute on 
Mental Retardation (4700 Keele St., Downsview 




When an individual person needs protection, 
spokesmanship, or freely-given expressive support, 
the citizen advocacy service should be the first 
line of defense to be called upon, except in case 
of certain major emergencies discussed below. 
Local citizen advocacy offices should be backed 
up by a state/provincial citizen advocacy office that 
could either be attached to a state/provincial level 
citizen action body, or that could be separately 
incorporated, perhaps by the local offices, and 
governed by representatives from the boards of local 
offices. 
Empowered Protective Service 
While citizen advocacy will furnish the voluntary 
personal, and primarily one-to-one, advocacy, the 
needed agency advocacy--but still the type of agency 
advocacy that tries to be also personal--would be 
provided by a protective service agency. A protective 
service needs to be defined quite differently if it is 
the only protective bulwark in a system than if it is 
one component in a global and balanced multi-component 
schema. For instance, in a "free-standing" context, 
a protective service might be defined similar to the 
terms of Helsel (1973): "the paid staff of a (quasi-) 
public agency, with or without other service 
responsibilities acting as a back-up service, provides 
case management, engages in action-oriented advocacy, 
exercises legally-sanctioned professional authority, 
and has a present readiness to assume legal authority 
and responsibility (i.e., guardianship) on behalf of 
any minor or impaired adult, on a potentially life-
long basis." According to Helsel, a protective service 
worker might provide outreach and prevention, counselling, 
coordination of services for individuals (as distinct 
from coordinating service systems), tracking and follow-
along, case auditing, legal intervention, case 
management, guardianship, and annual reports to 
courts and/or responsible state agencies. 
Assuming the presence of the global balanced 
schema proposed here, the definition of a protective 
service should be changed to the following: "The 
paid staff of an independent, legally-sanctioned, 
public, quasi-public, or private agency that provides 
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no other services, engages in action-oriented advocacy 
on behalf of any minor or impaired adult as a back-
up to citizen advocacy, and has the power and readiness 
to assume legal authority and responsibility (i.e., 
guardianship), preferrably on a short-term basis." 
Similarly, the functions of protective service workers 
would be revised to include outreach; referral of 
potential proteges to citizen advocacy; monitoring of 
citizen advocacy services; providing individuals in 
need, or their families, counselling that is 
relatively restricted to protective issues; in 
instances in which citizen advocacy is unable to meet 
needs, representing individual interests vis-a-vis 
service agencies; case tracking and auditing; legal 
intervention; guardianship if needed, replacing other 
forms of public guardianship; and annual reports as 
above, but including the relevant citizen and systems 
advocacy offices among its recipients. 
The protective service should be publicly 
mandated, but not necessarily vested in a public 
agency (it might be contracted to a private one). It 
would take up where citizen advocacy leaves off, 
e.g., it would utilize paid staff to provide advocacy 
and guardianship where it is not possible to recruit 
citizen advocates, and where the case work of 
clinical service agencies appears to be failing or 
insufficient. As with citizen advocacy, this function 
should not be vested in an agency that is also 
responsible for direct clinical services to the people 
to whom it might conceivably have to provide 
protective services. Furthermore, when a person 
appears to be in need of advocacy or protection, the 
citizen advocacy office should be the first one to be 
invited to enter the case, and only if it fails to 
marshall an advocate within a reasonable time period 
should it be permissible for the protective service 
to enter. 
While it is undesirable for a protective service 
agency to be a guardian, it is better than having no 
guardian at all, or a guardian that is a direct service, 
such as an institution. This is ~.hy the law should 
permit protective services to be the guardian only for 
emergency conditions, or where a citizen advocate 
57 
cannot be recruited to be guardian, as perhaps in some 
instances involving a child where adoptive parents 
cannot be found. 
A special word is in order about the function of 
"coordination of services" that is so often written 
into protective service legislation or specifications. 
The provision that protective services should 
coordinate other services could potentially be the 
beginning of the substitution of protective service 
for direct services--which is one of the perversions 
and mis-uses of protective services. Service 
coordination is a function of service providers, 
not of service consumers, monitors, or advocates. 
It is the responsibility of those who have been 
given public monies and have been mandated to 
provide rational services to provide service 
coordination. Protective services should "coordinate" 
services only in the sense of coordinating services 
to individual lives, which is quite different from 
coordinating services systemically. No one can 
coordinate services agencies and systems without 
having power over them, and that requires legal 
enablement on the service system delivery level, 
e.g., on the level of the local boards, governmental 
units, etc., through whom the money comes. While 
protective service needs empowerment for legal 
standing, access to clients, emergency intervention 
and possibly some forms of guardianship, this form 
of empowerment is quite different from the 
empowerment needed by regional/local directive, 
regulatory and governing bodies to bring rationality 
and efficiency to service-providing agencies. 
Whether there should be a single generic or 
several categoric (i.e., handicap-specific) protective 
service agencies in a region can be resolved over 
time and experience. At this point, it must be 
recalled that single protective service agencies 
encompassing all needs and conditions have not really 
worked. They are much more likely to work after 
strong ideological groundwork has been laid over a 
period of years, where numerous safeguards over its 
operations exist, and where personnel can be removed 
if they lose their dedication and strong commitment 
to the client. 
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Much like citizen advocacy offices, the 
protective service offices could also enjoy the 
support of a state/provincial level office. 
Corporate Collective/Systems Advocacy 
Finally, there is always a need for a collective 
corporate advocacy body. In its collective corporate 
advocacy, such a body is not concerned with individual 
grievances, but with patterns of problems, difficulties, 
shortcomings, and possibly with class needs. Since 
it is not presently conceivable that a single generic 
advocacy body, could address itself to all collective 
societal advocacy needs, it will be necessary to have 
a relatively large number of such advocacy bodies in 
operation, each concerned with a particular need in 
society. Thus, there may be a need for a corporate 
advocate on behalf of good public government and 
citizenship (such as Common Cause), on behalf of 
consumer protection and consumer rights (such as 
various consumer protection offices or some of the 
Nader organizations), and of course on behalf of 
any number of disadvantaged or handicapped groups 
in society. Ordinarily, where the latter are 
concerned, the corporate advocate would probably 
be a voluntary association of the affected individuals 
themselves, and/or of their friends and relatives, 
including ordinary citizens who have developed an 
interest in the welfare of the particular group. Of 
course, in structuring or carrying out such advocacy, 
it must be kept in mind that if the same body also 
delivers direct clinical services, that then there 
will exist inherent conflict between such services 
and the collective advocacy role, although there are 
several ways by means of which this conflict can be 
somewhat reduced. 
Among the roles of collective corporate advocate 
bodies should not only be advocacy functions, but also 
those change agentry functions that may or may not 
be advocacy, or that may be less clearly advocacy 
functions. This would include especially the 
review of legislation, class action litigation, and 
exerting influence on agencies in rigard to general 
policies rather than in regard to individual lives 
as handled by the Ombudsman, citizen advocacy, or 
protective service. 
59 
A corporate collective advocacy function should 
exist primarily on the state/provincial level, 
regardless of whether local/regional bodies or 
branches also exist; and it should be independent of 
direct service bodies. Again, if a suitable citizen 
action body already exists, it can serve as the governance 
carrier of the collective advocacy function. It not, 
such a body may need to be established. One example 
would be the Center on Human Policy in Syracuse, New 
York, although it is primarily locally/regionally 
oriented. 
GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
Some issues relevant to the governance of advocacy 
and protective services have already been covered, as 
in the conflict of interest and the immediately 
preceding sections. Some additional points must be 
mentioned here. 
Almost everywhere, a number of corporate 
structures suitable for the governance of one or 
another of the advocacy and protective services 
components already exist, but there are several 
potential problem areas that must be considered. 
For instance, state/provincial and local offices 
of citizen action groups are potential governing 
bodies, but may have conflicts of interest. If they 
do, they must be willing to divest themselves of the 
source of conflict; e.g., if they run direct services, 
they might spin them off to other agencies, perhaps 
even creating these agencies first. Furthermore, the 
desirable corporate structures may already exist, 
but not have adequate strength (primarily ideologically 
and in terms of governance) to be the locus of an 
advocacy function. Thirdly, while. some advocacy forms 
may fit into already existing structures, others need 
new structures that must yet be created. For example, 
it may be that a new structure for a protective 
service is needed, and a state/province might contract 
with state/provincial and local voluntary agencies to 
run it . However, a protective service structure must 
be separate from citizen advocacy programs, because of 
a recurring and universal temptation to pursue the 
conduct of protective or advocacy-type activities by 
hiring paid staff rather than by marshalling citizen 
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volunteers. The recruitment of such citizen volunteers, 
and the supports needed to facilitate the.ir functioning 
and perhaps maintain their motivation, are seen as 
costly and cumbersome, while paid staff are viewed as 
being able to address advocacy issues in an efficient, 
competent and ongoing basis. Unfortunately, there is 
enough truth to this view that even greater truths have 
been overshadowed. These greater truths are that many 
advocacy efforts by citizens have infinitely greater 
public and social credibility than "bought" advocacy; 
and no amount of bought advocacy can really compare in 
long-term social value and impact to even a moderately 
intense life-long or even long-term commitment to an 
advocacy pursuit on the part of an otherwise uninvolved 
citizen. 
Some advocacy projects have recognized these 
truths, and have tried to get the best of both worlds 
by utilizing both paid and unpaid advocates. However, 
an almost universal dynamic has been revealed by 
such efforts: in the short run, paid staff can always 
out-perform unpaid volunteers who must also carry out 
their other career functions. Thus, the temptation 
for paid advocacy staff to attend to all sorts of 
advocacy issues themselves, rather than going through 
the tedious process of recruiting, marshalling, and 
supporting a volunteer advocate, almost invariably has 
meant that volunteer efforts have not thrived. What 
volunteers may be recruited typically end up as 
volunteers to the agency rather than to the person in 
need, and they essentially then work for the staff 
instead of the other way around. In other words, 
staff advocacy and protective services drive out 
volunteer advocacy, analogous to clinical services 
driving out systemic services, and clinical/personal 
advocacy driving out systemic advocacy. Consequently, 
of the numerous safeguards that are practically 
essential for the operation of all sorts of advocacy 
and protection approaches, one is that in a project 
attempting to recruit citizen volunteers as individual 
advocates, paid staff should be prohibited from 
carrying out individual advocacy themselves. Only 
such a draconian measure will assure an unequivocal 
staff commitment to the recruitment of a volunteer to 
tackle an advocacy mission, rather than doing it oneself. 
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I highly recommend quasi-public agencies as the 
optimal corporate organizational structure for many 
services, including protective services. Such 
structures are rarely used in human services, but are 
most promising, having certain features of private 
organizations, but also certain official identities 
and sanctions. Many services can then be run without 
either governmental or voluntary association 
governance, yet both sectors can participate by 
contributing members to the governing board. It is 
almost a "best of both worlds" solution. 
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THE INTERPLAY AMONG THE SERVICE AND 
ADVOCACY/PROTECTION COMPONENTS 
Optimally, the mutual relationships of the different 
components described above would be acknowledged 
voluntarily by all the participating bodies, through 
the means of written agreements and procedures. On paper, 
certain routine processes, operating principles, 
standard operating procedures in regard to referrals, 
etc., should be a greed upon . This may necessitate the 
evolution of a series of agreements over time. Two models 
for such agreements in the relationship between citizen 
advocacy offices and clinical service agencies are 
contained in Wolfensberger and Zauha (1973). More are 
needed. Since voluntary agreements will not always be 
obtainable, at some point, recourse must be had to power 
play, and to coercion via change agentry, and possibly 
even legal fiat. 
Obviously, in a harmoniously functioning schema, 
the components would reinforce and support each other. 
For instance, a person's plight might be brought before 
the Ombudsman by a citizen advocate or protective service 
worker; a person might have both a caseworker and an 
' advocate, or an advocate and a protective service worker; 
the fact that one protege's problems are shared by many 
actual or potential proteges might be brought to the 
attention of a collective corporate advocacy body; etc. 
In regard to legal advocacy, I propose that it be 
conceptualized as functioning primarily in support of 
collective/systems advocacy, and of citizen advocacy. 
Systems advocacy could mean either a collectivity of 
citizens advocating, as a Mental Health Association, 
Association for Retarded Citizens, etc., might do, or 
an agency with paid employees advocating in such a 
fashion as to pursue service system quality. (The two 
might be the same . ) Within that schema of seeing legal 
advocacy as part of both systems and citizen advocacy, 
I would also advise not to use it more than is 
absolutely necessary, and to use it only when other forms 
of systems advocacy have failed, employing the persuasive 
and other forms first, and legal forms only as a supple-
mentary back-up. 
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THE PRIORITIES AMONG THE FIVE COMPONENTS 
Priorities must be conceptualized both in the 
abstract, as well as specified for a particular point 
in time. In a particular North American setting, the 
priorities we would assign to the five components 
specified above might not necessarily permit us to 
infer the "real" time-less priorities they should have. 
To perceive these more absolute priorities, one must 
almost assume a base-line social situation similar 
to "zero-budgeting." 
Thus, let us assume that a new nation were formed, 
perhaps an underdeveloped one that has few social 
structures, or at least few formal arrangements. From 
a perspective of building a strategic base for an 
adaptive society, I would give first priority--not 
to the structured professional-technical services, 
as is usually suggested or done--but to a well-funded 
citizen advocacy system, unless strong relationships 
of this nature were already part of that culture. 
Ultimately, human relationships will and must take 
precedence over any formalistic structures. Services 
where relationships do not, or do no longer, exist or 
function are the services of a dead society. 
There are other people who believe that informal 
relationships are very fragile and untrustworthy. 
Such individuals often argue that volunteers might 
come in for a while and then drop out, while the 
agency, or the professional, or the protective service 
"will always be there." There are parents who seek 
security for their handicapped children in the brick 
and mortar of institutions, on the assumption that 
the institution will always be there. I am reminded 
of a friend, a parent of a handicapped child, who has 
done a great deal to advance the development of public 
protective services. She has done so because she 
deeply believes in the security and relative permanence 
and presence of agencies and paid professionals. 
But there is a community in Syracuse that opened 
my eyes to the futility of that belief. It consists 
in part of a group of non-handicapped people who gave 
up much of their middle class lifestyles and accepted 
voluntary poverty, moving into a house in the slums 
with several homeless and drifting retarded adults. 
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Most of the non-handicapped members work, and they 
pool their incomes. Some of the handicapped members 
also chip in from their earnings or Social Security 
payments. This home is not incorporated, is not a 
"group home" in the usual sense, and receives no 
subsidies or funding. When I remarked on how 
fragile the set-up appeared to me, I was jolted 
into a new way of thinking by the remarks of one of 
the members. She reminded me that our social 
systems are collapsing, and that if agencies should 
ever be eliminated, and staff and staff salaries 
cut, any number of agency services will disappear. 
Under severe social stresses, the only thing that 
will save handicapped people is community. The 
vast majority of human service workers who are paid 
to serve handicapped people will no longer be 
present once they lose their jobs. Only the people 
who really love handicapped people and are prepared 
to live with them can offer any assurance of their 
survival. What then is more enduring: the salary 
of an agency worker, or an intimate intentional 
community of voluntary support? All human relation-
ships and structures are transitory. Even paid 
involvement is not necessarily more enduring and 
secure than personal involvement. Even when their 
salary is there, service workers' involvement is 
unstable, turnover in human services is very high, 
and case records are often records of agency and 
worker merry-go-rounds. 
I have been involved in the citizen advocacy 
movement since the beginning, but there are a number 
of things concerning it which have only relatively 
recently become clear to me. I am now convinced 
that a human service system--even an entire 
society--that lacks a significant number of voluntary 
one-to-one relationships between citizens and people 
in need absolutely will not work, and will collapse. 
When people are no longer willing to involve 
themselves personally and individually, it is all 
over. That is one of the problems we see in some 
parts of the country more than others: in some areas, 
if someone dies on the street, 3,000 people will 
walk over the body but nobody wants to get involved, 
no one will bind the wounds. 
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There are many people, especially wounded and 
handicapped people, who now do not have viable, 
relatively unconditional one-to-one supportive 
relationships. If people are no longer willing to 
engage in those kinds of relationships, laws can be 
passed, unlimited funds can be allocated--and still, 
nothing will work. That is why organized charity 
works so poorly. You can give infinite money to 
Goodwill, United Way, the Salvation Army, Catholic 
Charities, etc., or even unlimited tax money to the 
government for public human services, but if individual 
citizens, on~ personal basis, do not bind the wounds 
of the sick, do not give bread to the hungry, do not 
console the broken-hearted and visit the imprisoned, 
do not liberate the captives of oppression and do not 
bury the dead, then nothing will work. If everything 
has to be bought and people will no longer freely 
relate to each other, and especially to handicapped 
persons, one can spend $30,000 per person per year 
as they do now at Willowbrook (an infamous New York 
institution for the retarded), and the service will 
still be a snakepit. No amount of laws, agencies, 
money and paid staff can replace what Peter Maurin 
called "personalism." This is why so many of our 
service systems are dysfunctional, such as the 
criminal justice and penal system; too much is based 
on buying everything. This is why neither public 
welfare nor organized private charity has worked very 
well; it has been too remote. This also explains 
why so little else in our society is working anymore; 
it is due to the alienation of our comfort culture 
from the inescapable realities of human suffering and 
death. This is why elderly people are going into 
nursing homes and segregated high-rise apartments and 
segregated senior centers, because people do not want 
to be close to what they see (often falsely) aging to 
be: ugly, unpleasant, full of suffering and death. 
And one of the very prophetic messages being 
transmitted by and to our culture today is the 
fantastically growing wave of crime and violence 
against elderly people E.Y_ children. Newspapers are 
full of stories of elderly persons being violently 
attacked by our children; this has never happened 
before in our society, and hardly in any other. 
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Thus, because the relationship approach is 
fundamental to everything else, I give citizen 
advocacy first priority in a conceptual-ideological 
sense, and at least up to a level at which advocate 
recruiting appears to approach its asymptote. 
Volunteer advocacy is the closest thing in our society 
to our Judea-Christian ideals. Binding wounds, 
visiting the sick, liberating captives, etc . , lose 
most of their meaning when they are paid for . 
The second most important component in the 
schema after citizen advocacy is clinical services. 
The rendering of routine clinical services does not 
constitute protection, nor should advocacy and 
protective services be advanced as a substitute for 
such direct services, although in some places this 
is exactly what some people are trying to do. 
Advocacy can be a partial or occasional substitute 
for soft services (e . g.,guidance and counselling), 
but absolutely not for hard or direct services: 
it is no substitute for being able to go to school, 
or having a place to work, or, in a numerical sense, 
even for a place to live . 
The third most important option is the collective-
systemic advocacy. If the relationships are not there, 
this will not work either, but after having reasonable 
amounts of both citizen advocacy and clinical services, 
this would be the next most valuable addition. 
Fourthly, I would opt for Ombudsmanship, and 
would cal l for protective services last. Unfortunately, 
I do not know of any protective services system so far 
that has worked, and there ought to be a lesson in 
that. If schema after schema has failed, we ought to 
take a good hard look at the dynamics behind it, because 
there must be built-in nonfunctionalities, such as some 
of the incompatible functions I have mentioned. 
I recognize that the order of importance of the 
various components that I have sketched is totally 
different from the way most money for services is 
spent. Clinical services are usually provided first, 
and citizen advocacy last, if at all. Also, I am 
certainly not recommending that the above priorities 
should be adopted operationally on any local or 
state/provincial level. They are only offered as 
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principles and systemic concepts. In actual operations, 
they might inspire broad goals and strategies, but one 
would adopt those operational strategies that are 
feasible and promising in a particular setting. For 
instance, in a particular state/province, one might 
have to give highest priority in a given year to the 
legalization and funding of an Ombudsman's office 
because the opportunity is golden, other generic 
community groups are in support, and the measure has 
high likelihood of being accepted if vigorously 
advanced. During such a year, the advancement of 
citizen advocacy might be placed into a more long-
term (perhaps 3-year) strategic track. 
Also, it will probably never be possible to 
implement all advocacy/protection components at once, 
nor is it typically possible to implement even a 
single component for equally functional performance 
in all parts of a state/province. In almost all 
instances, it will be necessary and even desirable 
to implement piecemeal, in stages, and typically 
with some regions prior to others. Even with state/ 
provincial level functions (e.g., Ombudsman), it 
may be desirable to focus operations initially on one 
region, or on a few types of problems, and to add on 
as public support, legislative support, funding, staff 
and experience increase. Particularly, I suggest 
that citizen advocacy and protective services be 
implemented in one locale or region at a time, 
following the line of least resistance (i.e., 
greatest readiness and support); and even 
collective systemic, and legal advocacy methods, 
might benefit from regional sequencing of implementation. 
Of special impact would probably be the designation 
of the most promising locale or region as the pilot 
model for a state/province, and to implement there 
ahead of everywhere else, and with greatest care 
and support. Such a model can be a compelling 
persuader for many people, and can serve as a source 
of training and even staff spawning ground for other 
regions. 
Further, a word on the priority of deploying 
legal personnel seems in order. As mentioned before, 
legal advocacy should be viewed as a method that is 
merely one of many methods, used primarily on the 
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citizen advocacy, corporate systemic, and to some 
degree on the protective service level. Too often, 
advocacy is initiated by "hiring a lawyer." Yet 
perhaps one of the best ways of utilizing lawyers 
is to develop, over a long period of time, a pool 
of sensitive, human-service-knowledgeable and 
committed local attorneys on both a fee and 
voluntary basis. These lawyers would work with 
local advocacy bodies or branches, and only as 
and if a significant number of legal actions developed 
should a full-time attorney be employed at the state/ 
provincial level, in order to provide back-up and 
coordination. In the long run, probably more 
community change agentry will be achieved by 
working with community lawyers than by specially 
hiring them as staff on the local/regional level. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF ADVOCACY/PROTECTION TO 
OTHER SERVICE SAFEGUARDS 
The concept of service safeguards has already 
been discussed, and I have pointed out that there 
are numerous ways of working toward quality of human 
services. For instance, sound planning is one of 
these, systematization of the legal base is another, 
etc. However, a broad band of sound strategies can 
be subsumed under the concept of "safeguards," and 
all forms of advocacy can really be viewed as 
falling into the broader safeguards category. In 
our own work, we have differentiated between 
safeguards which are external to an agency, even 
if they have been internally initiated; and 
safeguards which are entirely internal, and are 
derived from general principles of organizational 
dynamics and self-renewal. In this paper, unless 
they are forms of advocacy/protection, none of these 
safeguards will be detailed, except that as an 
illustration of what we mean by "safeguards," Table 
5 lists 21 major external ones, and Table 6 lists 
some major internal ones. The reader will find most 
of the external safeguards covered in further detail 
in Wolfensberger (1973). 
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Table 5 
Examples of Human Service Monitoring Mechanisms 
And Quality Safeguards 
That Function External to Agencies or Service Systems 
I 1. Requiring Public Mandate 
A. Legislative Mandate & Guarantee Explicitly 
Based on Positive Ideology 
B. Resp0nsibility Vested in a "Specialty Point" 
C. Effective Regulatory Control 
D. Funding Made Contingent Upon Externally 
Evaluated Performance 
E. Categoric Specialty Services Backing up 
Generic Ones 
F. Institutionalization of Legislative Ombudsman 
System 
G. Protective Service System as Back-up to 
Citizen Advocacy 
H. Prohibition of Secret Transactions 
I. Consumer Participation in Governance 
2. Realizable Through Internal Agency Initiative 
A, Consumer Participation in Governance or 
Committees 
B. Recorded Individualized Objectives Reviewed 
with Consumer 
C. Routinization of Feedback from Consumers 
D. Formalization of Grievance Management 
E. Independent Advisory Committees 
F. Other Advisory Committees 
G. Routine External Evaluation by Experts 
H. External Consultancy 
• I. Written Agreements on Program Operations 
3. Under Control of Voluntary Citizen Action Associations 
A. Citizen Advocacy 
B. Independent Watchdog Committees 
C. Systematic Litigative Probing 
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Table 6 
Self-Initiatable Internal Organizational 
Self-Renewal and Quality Safeguards 
1, Maintaining Low Internal Boundaries 
A. Adoption of Strategies which Maintain Vitality 
and Avoid Age Imbalances in the Power Structure 
B. Legitimization and Institutionalization of 
Mutual Internal Critique and Self-Examination 
a. Internal Rotation of Personnel 
b. Regularization of an Objectified 
Personnel Review Process 
c. Establishing and Sanctioning Specific 
Occasions of Mutual and Self-Critique 
d. Establishing Tenured Internal Freedom-to-
Critique Positions 
e. Internalization of the Desirability of 
Internal Adversary Structures 
f. Regularized Conduct of Internal Self-
Evaluation 
2. Weakening of External Boundaries 
A. Recruitment of Highly Diversified Staff 
B. Exchanging Personnel With Other Agencies 
C. Relatively Frequent External Study Tours by 
Staff 
D. Bringing in External Study Groups 
E. External Assessment of Performance 
F. Commitment to External Adversary Structures 
G. Internalization of the Desirability of Consumer 
Participation on All Levels of the Organization 
3. Fiscal Enablement of Self-Renewal Mechanisms 
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However, one safeguard principle is relevant here, 
and that is the principle of "safeguard redundancy." 
This principle calls for the presence of a large number 
and variety of safeguards, for the reasons reviewed 
below. 
~ Any meaningful safeguard will be under pressure, if 
, not at one point, then later. Safeguards are 
inconvenient, sometimes expensive, and make the lives of 
service providers harder. Indeed, the temptation of 
some people to want to tie advocacy to particular 
agencies rather than to have it function independently, 
and/or tied to persons rather than agencies, stems from 
the very inability to conceptualize service safeguards 
other than advocacy as being legitimate, and constitutes 
a very common pressure on safeguards. 
Safeguards have to be laboriously planned and 
instituted, whereas abuses have a way of arising 
instantly. Indeed, there is no limit to the ingenuity 
and innovative development of new forms of abuse, and 
the best prevention is safeguards which a) are 
installed in advance of abuse, and b) are as innovative, 
as subtle, and as complex as abuse. By their very 
nature, safeguards will not always be functional, as 
~ they will invite repression, or have their ups and 
, downs for other common reasons. Redundancy provides 
a fail-safe and back-up mechanism in case one or 
more other safeguards weaken or disappear. 
Furthermore, different safeguards accomplish 
different missions: some safeguards are for persons, 
some for systems; different safeguards function on 
different levels of social organization; some 
safeguards are internal to the system, some are external 
to it; safeguards can be broad or specific; and 
different safeguards typically are accessible to 
different groups of persons in need. 
Finally, safeguards often reinforce each other. 
For instance, there may be complementation, as when 
an Ombudsman calls upon citizen advocates, or vice-versa. 
Also, one safeguard (e.g., a protective service) can 
watchdog another (e.g., individual program planning). 
ll Thus, for all these reasons, a service system needs 
, at least eight safeguards, i.e., two for each of the 








Examples of Human Service Safeguards 
in Two Crucial Dichotomies 
Internal External 
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In-House Staff Advocates 
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Legal Prohibition of 
Secret Transactions 
External Consultancy 
Advice & Assessment 









Some safeguard mechanisms can be implemented without 
any law whatsoever, such as many types of consumer 
participation, routinization of feedback from consumers 
and all internal safeguards. All that is needed is the 
will of the agency; at the most, it will cost money. 
Other external safeguards will require a public mandate, 
such as making funding contingent upon externally 
evaluated performance. There are only three external 
safeguards which are under voluntary association control, 
and because there are so few, voluntary associations 
need to hold on to these. 
The difference between safeguards for persons 
versus for systems is particularly important. What is 
good for the service system is not necessarily good 
for the service clients, and vice versa, as previously 
mentioned. 
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THE LIMITATIONS OF ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 
As mentioned before, it is unlikely that all 
desirable safeguard measures will be implemented at 
once. In fact, I do not even expect that we will often 
see them all existing and actually functioning as 
intended, even in the future. It is therefore important 
to exercise that rare discernment and judgement 
as to what is possible, what is feasible now, what is 
justified to try and risk, what is compromisable and 
what is not, etc. Here, we offer a few reflections and 
guidelines. 
One very realistic objection that may be raised 
against advocacy/protection efforts is that the 
proliferation of advocacy actions and other service 
safeguards can be very expensive not only as regards 
the funding of these efforts themselves, but also in 
regard to the cost of the changes that advocates may 
be pursuing. Relatedly, as discussed at great length 
in another paper (Wolfensberger, in press), cultural 
values may be so strongly opposed to certain changes 
that some types of advocacy actions may re f lect poorly 
advised priorities, or would not be actualizeable 
even if sustained by laws and court decisions. The 
same may occur if the technical prerequisites and 
knowledge for the implementation of an advocated 
outcome simply do not exist. 
One might well speculate what the optimal outcome 
might be in a society that had a superb continuum of 
comprehensive services, active citizen involvement in 
the political and service process, and all the advocacy 
and protection safeguards and mechanisms conceptualized 
in this paper. The outcome one would envision would 
almost certainly depend upon one ' s world view and one's 
perception of human nature. I propose that under 
those conditions, there would still be a great deal 
of human suffering, there would still be abuses, there 
would still be people falling between the cracks, and 
there would still be loneliness, alienation, and misery. 
No matter what is done, even if one has all the 
money in the world and the best staff, "nothing will 
work." Problems will not be solved, there will still 
be organizational problems and strife. Once one has 
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accepted this reality, one sees goals in human services 
quite differently. It then becomes a question of doing 
those things which maximize the likelihood of good 
things happening, and minimizing those things that 
increase the likelihood of bad things happening. There 
are no human solutions to human problems, nor are there 
, agency or legal solutions. Thus, our aspirations 
should not be for a utopia, and we should not put our 
hopes in the belief that improvements in human service 
technology, and even human seFVice or societal ideology , 
will solve all problems and dry all tears. Instead, a 
reasonable ideal is to pursue the implementation of a 
system that incorporates ideologies that are as 
positive as very weak human beings are able to adopt, 
and to operationalize strategies which are at least 
sound in principle even though not perfect in practice , 
Students in human service training come in very 
enthusiastic and idealistic, and if they cannot find 
a solution to something , they do not want to bother 
with it. They think it is not worth it. But if 
something is worth doing, it is worth doing even if one 
does not succeed. The important thing is to become 
engaged in the struggle, even though it may be 
terribly frustrating. Some people never learn this 
lesson, or see the relative futility of human efforts. 
It is ironic that it has not been recognized that 
throughout human history, there has neither been a 
change in human suffering (only in its types and 
sources), nor an acceptance of this fact. But once 
it is accepted, one can become free to do the right 
thing. The right thing may often be the thing that 
does not work, and one can only decide to do the 
right thing when one accepts the fact that it may 
not work, That is why so many people cannot and 
do not . do the right thing; that is why compromise 
is the role in human services. So many human service 
professionals do things which are not consistent with 
the ideals with which they came into the field--not 
because they do not know the right thing to do , but 
because they could not accept the cost. 
Thus, even if everything, including funding and 
~ coordination, has been done optimally, our "ideal" 
, service structures are still going to be poor. There 
will still be problems and weaknesses, because 
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the human condition is such that the "least worst" 
alternative is the best that is ever likely to be 
attained. 
The above is not an apology for mediocrity, 
but a caution against the apparently never-ending 
North American belief that the next round of 
technical developments will bring the answer to our 
problems. Even the best advocacy/protection system 
we are ever likely to see will merely improve our 
likelihood of attaining that "least worst" nervice 
configuration. 
Somewhat on the other extreme, many states in 
the United States are now scrambling to comply with 
the requirements of the Developmental Disabilities 
Act for advocacy provision, but what is lacking 
in this scramble is an internalization of the 
underlying issues. If the issues are not understood, 
the programs that are implemented or funded will not 
work, and we are more apt to get more of the same 
"much much worse than least worst" conditions such 
as we have had. In most states, the advocacy system 
probably will not work because the approach is a 
mechanistic-technological rather than ideological 
one. Also, an advocacy and protection system should 
not be looked upon merely as a response to a federal 
law to get money. Instead, it should be viewed as 
being, in its own right, an essential component of a 
well-rounded service system approach. 
Thus, the "least worst" situation should not be 
viewed as being the worst that could happen. Things 
could be much worse! Should cultural morality and 
values suffer such extensive collapse that most 
social transactions end up being placed on a conflict 
and confrontational model rather than a cooperative 
one, then no amount of formalization and regulation of 
the modes of conflict and confrontation will bring 
about societal viability. Instead, a situation will 
be brought about where there is a great diffusion and 
proliferation of powers to block the actions of other 
individuals and organizations, but where there will 
not exist sufficient concentration of constructively 
directed powers to accomplish the positive things that 
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are needed. In many ways, our society is rapidly 
approaching this point, and advocacy/protection 
systems that are based on improper ideologies, or that 
fail to arrest the ideological deterioration in our 




For further resources on the whole issue of social 
advocacy and Ombudsmanship, the reader may request 
assistance from the author (Wolf Wolfensberger, The 
Training Institute for Human Service Planning Leader-
ship and Change Agentry, 805 South Crouse Avenue, 
Syracuse, New York 13210) in the form of course and 
resource packages that have been developed for this 
purpose. Included in these resources are bibliographies 
and reading lists, social advocacies quiz items, and 
directions to yet additional sources. 
In Canada, the reader may request assistance from the 
Association Resources Division of the Canadian Association 
for the Mentally Retarded, Kinsmen NIMR Building, 
York University Campus, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview, 
Ontario, M3J 1P3. 
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